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1. Introduction 
Trade has been booming. The WTO ( World Trade Organisation) estimated that world 
trade in goods grew 8 % in volume terms last year, this being four times the growth of 
world GDP (Gross Domestic Products). During the 1990s international trade has 
grown far faster than world output, showing that national economies are becoming 
more closely linked. Foreign direct investment, another gauge of international 
economies integration, is also soaring: last year, estimated the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, cross border investment increased by 40%, to 
$315 billion 1. 
Actors in the international trade arena are the international merchants. The shift to 
international trade requires a legal landscape for these international merchants, in 
which to operate. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the emergence of 
national states' separate legal codification's often overlooked the requirements of 
international trade. The international lex mercatoria of the middle ages and its 
application to maritime matters was rather ignored during this period. In the early 
twentieth century, however, a re-emergence of the lex mercatoria can be observed. 
Conventions are regarded as an important source of international lex mercatoria. 2 In 
particular the transport conventions moved towards legal standardisation. International 
transport is the kingpin around which international trade turns~ it provides the physical 
basis without which intemational trade cannot take place. It encompasses the transport 
by air, road, rail and sea. The international carrier is the link, both physically and legal, 
between the seller in one country and the purchaser in the other. 
By its very nature international transport crosses international borders and involves 
different national systems. Without an international legal regime to govern 
international transport, each national leg would be governed by a different legal 
system. 
To avoid a possible conflict between the application of different legal systems, 
international convention have been drafted. International transport by air, road and rail 
is covered by one convention which enjoys a high degree of acceptance and 
dissemination. In relation to carriage by sea, however, a number of different legal 
conventions exists. The Hamburg Rules, as adopted in 1978, attempt to open the way 
to uniformity. But only 25 states have ratified the convention so far3, and none of them 
are major maritime states. Since the convention was intended to replace the current 
conventions which the majority of other states apply, it was and still is controversial. 
1 Economist, "All free traders now?", issue 07-12-96 
2 Hercules Booysen " International Transactions and the International Law Merchant" P. 48 (herein 
"Booysen") 
3 Uncitral home page http://www.un.or.at/uncitral 
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Question has been asked whether this new regime is needed at all and whether it is 
appropriate and acceptable. 
This paper will examine the necessity of the Hamburg Rules. This will be examined in 
light of the competing interests between carrier (ship) and shipper (cargo). Its failure 
or success and its prospects for the future will be assessed. This will include, inter alia, 
a historical summary of the rules, the background against which they were drafted, 
their important amendments, the pros and cons of these amendments, their acceptance 
within the maritime world, the problems that arise when different regimes co-exist and 
the contribution of the Rules to a standardisation or a international lex mercatoria, 
facilitating international trade. 
2. The Historical Background of the Hamburg Rules 
2.1. Wooden sailing ship age 
Both the English and the Roman Law defined the common carrier as a person, or an 
association of persons, who in the course of business publicly hold himself out to take 
goods of everybody, provided he has room in his conveyance, at a standard rate, or at 
least a reasonable one. The common carrier was, in contrast to the private carrier, 
under a duty to accept goods tendered to him for carriage 4. 
From early on and well into the last century, the carrier's liability was governed in the 
civil law countries by the old Roman law concept ofreceptum nautarum5, which 
imposed an absolute liability on the shipmaster, owner or charterer, and the innkeeper 
and stablekeeper. A reason for the introduction might have been the difficulty of proof 
for the shipper. Carriers were regarded as insurer of goods entrusted to them and their 
liability was absolute and hence independent of fault. Limited exceptions for the carrier 
were recognised such as: casus fortuitus, damnum fatale and vis maior6. All the 
exceptions contained elements ofunavoidability, unexpectedness and irresistibility. 
In the common law countries liability of the carrier was very similar. It was the age of 
town and family based operations where cargo carried was owned, at least in part, by 
the shipowner himself Theory and reality united in the description of a voyage as a 
common venture and the shipment of cargos as a joint venture of cargo owners and 
shipowners. This common venture idea was already illustrated in earlier times by the 
presence of representatives of cargo owners on board the vessel in order to look after 
the goods and arrange for their sale at the destination. It was the time where no 
demand for bulk cargos existed since large manufacturing plants had yet to be build 7. 
4 Chotley & Giles "Shipping Law" eighth edition, P. 166(herein "Chorley & Giles") 
5 William RA. Birch Reynardson/Kaj Pineus/Hans Georg Rohreke "The Maritime Carrier's Liability 
under the Hamburg Rules" in Festschrift fur Rolf Stodter, P.3(8)(herein "Reynardson", "Pineus" or 
"Rohreke") 
6 Booysen, supra 2, P. 246 
7 Joseph C. Sweeney "UNCITRAL and the Hamburg Rules-The risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods" in Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1991, P. 511(512)(herein 
"Sweeney") 
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The carrier was liable for what he had taken into custody and he was relieved of his 
liability only in cases of act of God, inevitable accident, inherent vice, latent defect and 
defective packaging8• 
The French law was very similar to the common law with exceptions to liability being 
based largely on force majeure. 
Hence the shipowner's liability under both the common law and the civil codes was in 
theory strict. Until the end of the 19th century the shipowner and the shipper were in 
apparent agreement that the shipowner was responsible for carrying and delivering 
safely the goods in like good order and condition. At that time the bill of lading 
emerged as the document which specified the goods and formed the basis for any 
claims for non-delivery and damage9. 
Towards the end of last century in Germany this "strict" liability was transformed and 
based on the principle of fault10. 
The question whether maritime law is fairly balanced between cargo and carrier was 
until as late as the 19th century not regarded as of pressing importance, since the only 
available vessels were small sailing ships, and cargos were not usually of a perishable 
nature. In the rare cases where damage to the cargo arose, it was caused mostly by 
storms which was considered as force majeure11 . A certain amount of damage to the 
cargo was expected -as an incident of every ocean voyage and very little litigation 
found its way into the courts until the mid 19th century. Further, until the advent of 
steam, the absence of the modern need for speedy despatch of vessels in port, fostered 
a tolerance of more leisurely methods of cargo handling and tallying ashore. This 
factor in turn afforded greater opportunity for more careful ship-side tallies than is 
perhaps possible today; disputes were reduced as to where and when any loss or 
damage was caused. 
2.2. Second haff of the 19th century 
This was the age of technical and economical propulsion and of iron ships. Freight 
increased visibly, the circulation accelerated which made the control more difficult. 
Transport by sea became more independent from the force of nature. Besides the 
shipowner/captain and the shippers, more and more people were involved, like the 
consignee and the endorsee, and the Bill of lading became a running document. The 
perils of collisions increased because of the growing density of traffic and with it the 
costs of the damages. Loss or damage to the cargo couldn't always attributed to vis 
maior, act of God or force majeure. Thus the liability based on the principle of fault 
became a huge risk for the business of the carrier. 
8 Reynardson, supra 5, P.8 
9 W.E. Astle "Hamburg Rules" P.3 (herein "Astle") 
10 Sec 607 of the German Commercial Code of May 31, 1861 
11 Prti.Bmann/Rabe "Seehandelsrecht" 3.Auflage, Vor § 556 I A (herein "Prti.Bmann/Rabe") 
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The shipowners then took advantage of their monopoly position. The carriers liability 
had always been subject to the principle of freedom of contract which enabled a 
shipowner to carry goods "when he liked, as he liked, and wherever he liked"12with the 
result that, in their Bills of lading, carriers inserted quite a number of exceptions, the 
most important of them being that they were not liable for error in the navigation and 
management of the ship. This was a remarkable shift Transferring risk of loss or 
damage of goods on to the shippers. Also, the legislature in England in 1734 and in the 
USA in 1851 (the Fire Statutes) came to the aid of the carrier excluding the carriers 
liability for loss or damage arising from fire on board. 
The pendulum of liability had swung from the owner to the shipper. 
2.3. Fight for the contracting out clause 
Because of the shift of liability, discontented shippers of cargo, their bankers, and their 
underwriters pressed for statutory reform throughout the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. But shipowner interests dominated the parliaments of the big shipowner 
countries such as Britain, France and Germany, and until the early 1920s, neither 
judges nor lawmakers in these countries paid much heed to the complaints of the cargo 
owners. 
In the United States shipowning interests were few. This was the result of British 
domination of the American export business. American cargo interests became 
increasingly vulnerable to clever lawyering on behalf of British shipowners at a times, 
whert ocean trade became more sophisticated; through the elaboration of shipping 
documents, banker's drafts, bills oflading, insurance policies, and methods arose to 
subrogate tort and contract claims for damages and to avoid or defend such claims. 
Litigation exposed vast differences amongst the attitudes of American, English, and 
European courts concerning the nature of the carrier's obligations and the property of 
contracts exonerating carriers from their general maritime liabilities. The European and 
English courts routinely upheld contracts of exoneration, but American courts typically 
struck them down by -helding that carriers' bill of lading clauses that disclaimed 
responsibility for negligence violated public policy13 . In the United States, powerful 
cargo-.shipping interests were less able to bring claims because English carriers 
included choice of law and forum clauses in their bills of lading that shifted the focus of 
the litigation from America to Britain. American shippers worked diligently for 
statutory protection of their position resulting in the passage of the Harter Act of 
1893. It forbade clauses of exoneration, which shipowners as a matter of course had 
inserted in bills oflading to escape liability. The response abroad was mixed. 
Dominions of the British Empire, notably Australia( Carriage of Goods Sea Act in 
1904), New Zealand ( Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in 1908), and Canada( Canadian 
Water Carriage Act in 1910), essentially copied the Harter Act into their own statutes. 
12 David C. Frederick "Political Participation and Legal Reform i1,1 the International Maritime 
Rulemaking Process: From the Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules" in Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 1991, P. 81(83) (herein "Frederick") 
13 John 0. Honnold "Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness-Hague or Hamburg?" in Journal 
of the Maritime Law and Commerce 1993, P. 75(77) (herein "Honnold") 
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The effect of these laws in England was minimal, where due to the presence of marine 
insurance and shipowning interests, much admiralty litigation occurred. The power of 
the shipowning interests mitigated the overall international impact of the attempted 
reform. 
But then the British Empire emerged from World War I with diminished power and the 
British carrier interests entered the 1920s in a weakened financial state14. Besides that 
there was also an oversupply of shipping space. This changed economic circumstances 
which impelled carriers to accept shippers' bill oflading proposals for the first time. 
Cargo interests from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, still tied to the crown, took 
advantage of the glut in cargo-carrying capacity to press for equity in commercial 
maritime transactions. 
2.4. Bill of lading Clauses and the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
With the growth of international trade and the hazard of ships moving from port to 
port and being subject to arrest in conjunction with maritime liens to satisfy 
outstanding claims, the practical value of uniformity was very much needed as a basis 
for the bills oflading, contracts of sale of goods, marine insurance on cargo and on 
liability. Accordingly the subject was taken up by the Comite Maritime 
International("CMI''), a private law organisation composed of many national 
associations devoted to the development of uniformity in international maritime law. 
The CMI, originally a committee of the international Law Association, was formed in 
1897 for the purpose of promoting world-wide uniformity of maritime law, and has 
since had its own separate existence15 . 
After considerable discussion among the leading shipowners, underwriters, shippers, 
and bankers of the major maritime nations, a set of rules were finally drafted by the 
Maritime Law Committee of the International Law Association at a meeting held at the 
Hague in 1921 and which came to be known as the Hague Rules. The rules contained 
several principals of the Harter Act. The rules were drafted in the form of a uniform 
bill of lading in the hope that the shipping companies would adopt them voluntarily and 
that similar enterprises would soon follow suit. One or two shipping companies did 
adopt the rules, but generally the companies were not prepared to give up their 
extensive immunities from liability under the then existing laws of many countries. It 
was soon apparent that legislation would be necessary to make the uniform Rules part 
ofbills oflading16 . 
The Hague rules were amended at the London Conference of the CMI in 1922, and 
thereafter agitation for legislative action on the lines of the Rules continued. A 
diplomatic conference on Maritime Law was held in Brussels in 1922, and a draft 
convention was drawn up which was amended at the Brussels Convention in 1923. 
The Belgian Government then invited all interested governments to participate in the 
14 Frederick, supra note 12, P. 86 
JS John C. Moore "The Hamburg Rules" in Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1978, P.1(2) 
(herein ''Moore") 
16 Astle, supra note 9, P.8 
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Fifth Maritime Diplomatic Conference, which was held at Brussels in August, 1924, at 
which the convention was signed on August 25, 192417. Despite the widespread 
agreement in 1924 in the maritime industry concerning the need for this international 
convention , it did not come into force until 1931, one year after the deposit of 
ratifications by four states: the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and Hungary. Today 
72 Contracting parties have ratified the Rules, including a large number of developing 
countries 18. The list and the corresponding year of adhesion to the Convention show 
that quite a number of these countries are Contracting Parties simply because they 
inherited the Hague Rules from their position as colonies. 
With the principle that the carrier should bear the commercial but not the navigational 
risks and that he could avoid the liability thus established, a compromise had been 
found. The language of the Hague Rules is the language of business or, more 
precisely, the language of Bills of Lading. The main features of the Hague Rules are 
• -immunities in favour of the carrier 
• -the requirement to produce a seaworthy ship and the requirement that the 
shipowner exercise due diligence 
• -limitation of the liability of the carrier 
• -not contracting out unless to the advantage of the shipper 
One of the problems the Hague Rules set out to solve was the limit of liability per 
package or unit. This was fixed at pound 100 sterling gold value. Already in the year 
1925 the pound was to loose its convertibility into gold. This upset the carefully 
negotiated system of the carrier's liability. As a result, each contracting State 
converted the x 100 in its own way, leading, after the Second World War, to totally 
conflicting rules. 
Eventually, it became obvious that technological progress had made it necessary for 
the rules to be amended. Some time later, containerisation began to play a steadily 
increasing role in world cargo transport, thereby accelerating the need for correction. 
The CMI therefor met in 1959(at Rijeka) to consider reforms to the Convention19. A 
second meeting was held in 1963 in Stockholm and a document signed in Visby, a 
ancient port on the Swedish island Gothland in the Baltic Sea20 . Finally a diplomatic 
conference was held in Brussels in 1967-68. This conference was attended by 53 
countries and territories, of which approximately half were developing. The Brussels 
Protocol of Amendments to the Hague Rules was finally signed on February 23,1968. 
The Protocol was named the Visby Rules. The Protocol came into force with the tenth 
instrument of ratification on June 23, 1977. The key issue in the protocol was the 
amount and method of fixing the unit limitation of liability21 . The maximum liability of 
the carrier increased to 200 pounds or an amount determined by a factor derived from 
17 Astle, supra note 9, P. 8 
18 UNCTAD Report by the UNCTAD secretariat "The Economic and Commercial Implications of the 
Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules and The Multimodal Transport Convention" figure 6 (herein 
"UNCT AD Report"), with a list of all member states and the year when the Rules came into effect 
19 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, P.13 
2° Captain Liiddeke "Seminar on the Hamburg Rules", P.3 (herein "Liiddeke") 
21 the Visby Protocol has 19 Contracting Parties according to UNCT AD Report, supra 18, P. 8; all the 
Contracting Parties to the Visby Protocol were also Contracting Parties to the Hague Rules 
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the mass of the goods and the gold franc. Other amendments dealt with the application 
of the Rules, the extension of the bill of lading limitations and exceptions to stevedores 
and agents of the carrier, and the rule that statements in bill oflading are to be 
regarded as conclusive evidence when they have been transferred to third parties. 
Unfortunately, the international monetary system's bench-mark, the Bretton Woods 
system broke down soon afterwards, and it became necessary again to amend the 
monetary limits, and so a new diplomatic conference was held in Brussels. This 
conference was attended by 37 countries, of which a number were developing, and a 
new protocol was elaborated, the 1979 Protocol to the Visby Protocol. It came into 
force in February 1984 and has 11 Contracting Parties, none of which is a developing 
country. The protocol is named the SOR-Protocol( SDR for "Special Drawing 
Rights") and has the effect of expressing the monetary limits in terms of special 
drawings rights as opposed to the rather complicated gold francs formulae in the 
original Hague-Visby Rules22. 
2.5. Hamburg Rules 
The Hamburg Rules marks a change of a movement towards international uniformity 
on the area of shipping law. For over a half century, conventions to shipping law were 
drafted by the CMI. This private institution convened practitioner and science of the 
shipping law from the main maritime countries for analysing new problems; it often 
was able to propose provisions close to the praxis. The drafts by the CMI shaped then 
the objects of state conferences, which since 1910 took place in Brussels at irregular 
intervals. 
This development found an end in 1968 with the adoption of the Visby Rules23 . Since 
that time international legislation has been exclusively adopted in the framework of 
international state organisations. Thus, shipping law has followed a development which 
has already been taken place in other legal areas. 
Besides the fact that thorough proposals to amend the Hague Rules were defeated in 
discussions within the CMI, the most important reason for this shift away from IMO 
was of a political nature. The stress on international legal uniformity had created new 
organisations, which now took care even on merchant shipping: 
-the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation(IMCO)- now 
International Maritime Organisation(IMO) 
-the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
-the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development(UNCTAD). 
The development concerning IMO was triggered by the perils caused by the oil 
transport on sea. Although CMI had already focused on this problem, it was the effort 
22 Jane Martineau "Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules" in The International Journal of 
Shipping Law 1996, P.12 (herein "Martineau") 
23 Rolf Herber "Gedanken zur internationalen Vereinheitlichung des Seehandelsrechts" in Festschrift 
Stodter P. 55(60), (herein "Herber" FS) 
by IMO which lead to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 1969 and the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage in 1971. Even in other 
fields the IMO became active. The IMO virtually overtook the function of the 
Brussels- Conferences24. But maritime transport law broke the operational framework 
of IMO, which mainly was engaged with public law. However it fitted exactly into the 
mandate of UNCITRAL, founded in 1968. 
But first it was Unctad, organised in 1964, which adopted to the problem of maritime 
transport law. On its second meeting in 1969, the UNCTAD Working Group on 
international shipping legislation was established. In 1971 its task was extended to 
examine certain key-problems of the carriage of goods by sea. In UNCTAD a 
considerable dissatisfaction with traditional maritime law prevailed among the 
"colonist" powers. This dissatisfaction stemmed from the belief that the operation of 
traditional maritime law(along with other aspects of international trade law) continued 
to impair the balance of payment position of developing states so as to contribute to 
continued poverty and under-development in an industrial age25 . The emerging nations, 
which were not in existence when the Hague Rules were negotiated, encountered a 
commercial system based upon principles formulated well before these economic and 
political changes. Shipping played an important role in the economic development of 
the new states because exports to industrialised nations accounted for a high 
percentage of their gross national product. Thus the developing countries insisted on a 
greater role in the decisionmaking process that governed commercial maritime rules. 
They pressed for reform of the current law within the context of existing United 
Nations organs and benefited from a two-third majority in the UNCTAD. At that time 
the developing countries accounted for 64. 7 percent (in terms of weight) of all 
maritime shipments, but owned only 7.6 percent of the world's maritime fleet. This 
disparity had a dramatic impact on balance of trade. The International Monetary Fund 
estimated that the deficit created by shipping costs alone produced approximately one 
third of the developing world's entire balance of payments deficit26 . This choice of 
forum arguably reflected both a distrust of the network established by the traditional 
maritime powers and a confidence in the United Nations as a organ dedicated to the 
international problem-solving. But nevertheless the Hamburg rules were not merely the 
product of developing states as they could never have been achieved without the co-
operation of the developed states: Australia, Canada, France, Norway and the United 
States27. 
Although in the beginning UNCT AD was responsible for this problem. It was 
considered prudent to shift the legal question arising out of bills oflading to the 
expertise ofUNCITRAL, while UNCTAD's activities in the area of shipping focused 
on economic issues. UNCITRAL, a world-wide representative body with the mandate 
to reduce barriers to international trade resulting from conflicting and inadequate laws, 
has established an enviable reputation for professional, non-political and successful 
24 Herber FS supra 23, P. 61(62) 
25 Sweeney supra 7, P. 520 
26 Frederick supra 12, P. 103 
27 Sweeney supra 7, P.523; Rolf Herber "Gedanken zum Inkrafttreten der Hamburg-Regeln" in 
Transportrecht November/Dezember 1992 P.381(384) (herein "Herber 92") 
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work28 . UNCITRAL was<already faced at its first meeting with three big issues: the 
uniformity of the rights of international payments; the international sale of the goods 
and the carriage of goods at sea. Its work-products include, inter alia, the Vienna 
Convention which established a uniform law for the international sale of goods and the 
widely-used Uncitral Arbitration Rules(1976). In retrospect, the foresight of the 
decision to instruct UNCITRAL with the task has proven fruitful that it produced a 
draft convention free of the political and economic discord which sometimes burden 
the decision-making process ofUNCTAD. 
Besides political reasons, factual reasons also exists for the activity by UNCITRAL. 
The technical development like that concerning containerisation and the strong 
differences of national legislation ratifying the Hague Rules, call for a reform29. The 
Visby-Protocol hasn't answered these calls. 
The uncertainties in the Hague Rules produced two expensive consequences for the 
developing nations. Firstly, the Rules obligated the owner of the goods to insure 
against contingencies or other ill-defined risks that bills oflading failed to anticipate, 
and the companies in the developing world were financially less able to shoulder this 
burden. Secondly, ambiguities in the Hague Rules or their failure to anticipate 
technological developments often caused disputes between shippers and carriers that 
required arbitration or litigation. 
UNCITRAL, following its established procedures, created a Working Group of 21 
States, representing each region and legal system. The negotiations differed from the 
Hague Rules negotiations in several key respects. No Talks in backrooms amongst 
carriers, cargo owners, bankers, and insures which reflect commercial, rather than 
political, realities were held. The negotiations that marked the Hamburg Rules took on 
a distinctly political hue. The delegates, selected under political auspices, formally 
represented countries and voted on specific draft provision as such. United Nations 
practices dictated that UNCITRAL decisions be reached by consensus with indicative 
voting kept to a minimum. Majority rule prevailed30 . After five years of sustained 
effort, this Working Group, with the active participation of intranational organisations 
with expertise in this field, completed a draft convention which the secretary-general 
transmitted to all governments and interested international organisations for comments. 
The full Commission conducted an intensive review of this draft and in 1976, without 
dissent, approved a Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea; the secretary-
general transmitted this draft to all Governments and interested international 
organisations for further comments. In 1978 a diplomatic conference of seventy-six 
States and eight governmental and seven non governmental organisations31 met at 
Hamburg. It was the first UN-Conference on German soil (Germany had acceded to 
the UN Conference in 1973). On March 30, 1978, 68 voted in favour without dissent 
and there were 4 abstentions (Canada, Greece, Liberia, and Switzerland) to adopt the 
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea-the ''Hamburg Rules". It was then 
28 Honnold, supra 13, P. 79 
29 Rolf Herber 92, P. 381(383) 
3° Frederick supra 12, P. 104 
31 Ltiddeke, supra 20, P.12 
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signed by 27 States32. The Convention provided that it would enter into force a year 
after adherence by 20 States; the Convention entered into force on November 1, 1992. 
The Hamburg Rules have now been ratified by the following 25 States33 : 
Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia34. 
3. Shortfalls of the Hague Rules 
A lot has already been said about the political motivation behind the draft of the 
Hamburg Rules. The convention, however, is primarily addressed to international trade 
and its participants as it deals with private law aspects. Thus, its success, indicated by 
the number of ratifications, links to its economic suitability. Here it must also be taken 
into account, that no state can be forced to ratify the Rules and that only with the 
approval of the maritime groups will a ratification on national level be realistic. 
To judge the work done by UNCITRAL and all its participating groups and delegates 
which resulted in the Hamburg Rules, a consideration of its commercial practicability 
and scientific value is only possible when one first examines the shortfalls of the Hague 
Rules. 
The law of carriage of goods belongs covers a wide range of legal areas. This 
necessitated an adjustment of the applicable national laws, since they were often 
different. These differences initiated the drive for standardisation through international 
conventions. The Convention International Concernant le Transport des Marchandises 
par Chemins de Fer(CIM), concluded at Bern in October 1890, stood at the beginning 
of the standardisation of trade law. It was followed by the Hague Rules(1924) 
concerning the carriage of the goods, the Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air-the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 
and the Convention on the contract for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road(CMR) of 1959, together constituting, with some subsequent protocols, the 
major pillars of the international law of carriage. Most of these conventions on carriage 
contain one, at least unilateral provision, in favour to the cargo owner, which relates to 
the liability of the carrier for damages suffered by cargo between acceptance of the 
goods and their delivery, unless the carrier can prove that it wasn't his or his servants 
fault. This liability is always limited to a certain amount and was dependant on average 
value of the goods and the kind of transport used. Only the maritime law area with its 
Hague Rules was the cargo owner not so favourably treated, even if one considers the 
Visby-Protocol. A list of shortfalls follows: 
32 Liiddeke, supra 20, P.10 
33 International Union Of Marine Insurance "IUMI Position Paper 'Hamburg Rules'", P.4 (herein 
"IUMI") 
34 Martineau, supra 22, gives on pages 25,26,27 the dates when the Rules came into effect in the 
single countries 
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a) The carrier by sea is imperatively just liable for damages which occur during then 
time while the goods are on board (Article l(e) Hague Rules). This is the so-called 
''tackle to tackle" principle. For the time on land in between occupation and 
before deliver the carrier is able to exclude for liability contractually. This is the object 
of all international bills oflading. The shipper has no choice. This didn't cause 
problems in ancient times when the shipper normally delivered his cargo in the port, on 
the dock, underneath the ship's hook. 
The "critical point" was at the ship's rail. Nowadays the critical point moves 
ashore, were the goods are containerised and the carrier might take delivery of the 
container right at the shipper's factory. Both the Incoterms and the documentary 
practise have accommodate to this situation, in contrast to the Hague Rules. 
b) According to the Hague Rules the carrier isn't liable for an act, neglect or default of 
the master, mariner, pilot, or other servants in the navigation or in the management of 
the ship. To categorise areas of responsibility and immunity opens up many areas for 
uncertainty. Since the Hague Rules do not address the problems that result from the 
interplay of its complex lists of carrier immunities and responsibilities, interpretations 
in other countries come to divergent conclusions, which lead to complex and 
unpredictable problems of conflict oflaws and more grounds for forum-shopping. 
c) No liability exists for cargos carried on deck as the Hague Rules do not considered 
them as goods according to the definition in article I( c). If cargo is carried on deck but 
this is not stated on the bill oflading and this bill oflading is transferred to a third 
party, then the carrier is fully liable for all damages without any limitations. 
d) The Hague-Visby Rules only apply after the issue of a bill oflading. This "document 
of title" limitation has generally been understood to cover a document that must be 
surrendered in exchange for the goods. The increased speed of ocean transport and 
current payment and financing arrangements have led to shipment under contracts 
( often called "waybills") that do not require the contract to be surrendered before the 
goods can be unloaded and delivered - a development that avoids difficulties in 
delivery that may result from delayed arrival or loss of a "document of title". By using 
a ''waybill" or by refraining from using other contracts as documents at all-which often 
happens today with the use of electronic data processing- the carrier is free in 
determining the rules relating to liability. 
e) The insufficiency of the low limitation amount in the Hague Rules is still applied in a 
lot of countries. It had, in accordance with existing practice, been set at Pound 100 
gold/sterling per package or shipping unit and converted into other currencies at the 
rates of exchange prevailing in the 1920's and early 1930's. Over the years, inflation 
had eroded the value of pound 100 gold, differential rates of inflation had created 
international disparities, with potential conflict oflaw problems, and technological 
developments had increased the size of packages from those which could be man-
handled by two men to the 40-foot container, weighing, with its contents, up to 35 
tons. The question of what was and what was not a "package" has created chaos in 
many countries35 . Accordingly the Visby Protocol introduced the weight alternative 
.,. 
35 Moore, supra 15, P.3 
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and has increased the limit of liability. The SDR Protocol again has faced the problem 
concerning the inflation. 
f) The paragraph II of the protocol allowed countries different possibilities of national 
adoptions36. Thus the same Rule out of the Hague shell document could be interpreted 
differently in one state from another state also interpreting the Rules in its national law 
with individual amendments. 
g) The Hague Rules normally apply only to outbound shipments, which creates 
difficulties, when, as usual, damage is not discovered until the cargo is unloaded and 
the shipments arrives from a non-Contracting State to a state who has adopted the 
Hague Rules. Attempts to avoid this result by invoking conflict rules resulted in 
uncertainties37. This problem has been partly tackled by the Visby Rules which 
extended the application to every carriage when the Bill of Lading is issued in a 
contracting state, or the contract provides the application of the Rules. 
h) The Rules cover to problems that arise from transhipment, where container traffic is 
organised in collection and distribution patterns around transhipment centres and 
different carriers can be included without knowledge when the bill oflading was 
issued. 
i) The Hague's special immunities create practical difficulties when, as is increasingly 
common, carriage to a destination requires different types of transport-road, rail, sea 
and air. None of the other international conventions grants the carrier immunity for 
negligent loss or damage. These radical differences in the responsibility of connecting 
carriers create difficulties for shippers and consignees in fixing responsibility and 
enforcing claims. 
The differences with international conventions governing other modes of transport also 
hampered the creation of a convention on multimodal transport. 
The number of shortfalls caused a call for the creation of a new convention rather than 
just another amendment. 
4. Innovations by the Hamburg Rules 
Besides the political circumstances mentioned earlier it was above all the latter 
mentioned shortfalls which induced many states to work towards improvements of the 
liability regime. It wasn't only the developing countries which pushed for 
improvement. Even industrialised countries like the United States, Canada, Australia 
and France38, also participated. They all however primarily represent cargo interests. 
These countries even determined the factual negotiation at UNCITRAL and finally the 
36 Karl-Hartmann Necker "Zur Statutenkollision im Seefrachtrecht" in Festschrift Stodter, P.90 
(herein "Necker") 
37 Honnold, supra 13, P. 85 
38 Herber 92, supra 27, P. 384 
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diplomatic conference in Hamburg39. Of course, since the sixtieth the influence of the 
developing countries on international conferences under the auspices of the UN is 
considerable. In these countries the international traders suffered more under the 
shortcomings of the existing rules than in industrialised countries since they do not 
have a functional insurance system which makes the shortfalls of liability bearable by 
the concerned shipping industry. Nevertheless, the delegates from these countries were 
reluctant to impose by their numerical majority an international regime unacceptable to 
the industrial countries. The actual legal changes in the new Rules are insignificant 
when compared to the political transformation in the international maritime rulemaking 
process that accompanied the promulgation of the Hamburg Rules40 . 
The solutions by the Hamburg Rules for the problems are manifold: 
1. Concerning the period of coverage: The Rules provides that they are operative 
throughout "the period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port 
of loading, during the carriage and at the port of discharge" according to Article 
4 .1. The carrier will generally be responsible from when he takes over the goods at 
the loading port until he hands them over at the discharge port(article 4.2). 
Accordingly, responsibility under the Hamburg Rules may well arise before and/or 
after the time then when responsibility under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules 
would be applicable. 
2. Under the Hamburg Rules there is no exemption in case of fault of the carriers 
servants or agents in the course of the navigation or management of the vessels. 
Article 5 of the Hamburg Rules provides that the carrier is liable for cargo damage 
unless- he proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could 
reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences. This signifies 
an abolition of the defence of nautical fault and a shift of risk of loss towards the 
carrier. The pendulum again has been moved, this time in favour of the shipper. 
3. The carrier is liable for deck cargo according to Article 1. 5. Deck cargo is 
permissible provided deck carriage is authorised by the shippers or it is a custom of 
the trade. Unless the bill oflading expressly states that the shipper agrees to 
carriage of the cargo on deck, the onus lies on the carrier to prove the authorisation 
by the shipper. If the carrier ships cargo on deck contrary to an agreement or the 
custom of the trade, he is liable " for loss of or damage to goods as well as delay 
and delivery resulting solely from the carriage on deck". 
4. The Rules apply to any contract whereby the carrier undertakes against payment of 
freight to carry goods by sea from one port to another according to Article 1. 6 . 
This includes sea waybills, booking notes and any other non-negotiable documents. 
5. The limits ofliability are increased to 835 SDR per package or 2.5 SDR per kilo 
according to Article 6, which means an increase by approximately 25 per cent over 
the Hague-Visby limits. This agreement is part of the "package solution"41 . 
6. The Hamburg Rules must be ratified as a uniform code. Any amendments must be 
sought out in a conference according to Art 32 of the rules42. Furthermore Art 3 
provides a policy on how the convention should be interpreted, namely with regard 
39 Herber 92, supra 27, P. 384 
4° Frederick, supra 12, P. 82 
41 see below under heading 5.10. 
42 Necker, supra 36, P. 94 
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to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity. This method 
has already been adopted in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention of 1980). 
7. The Hamburg Rules also apply to inward voyage according to Article 2 by making 
the Convention applicable, inter alia, when either "the port ofloading or the port of 
discharge" is in a Contracting State43 . 
8. In handling transhipment problems Hamburg deals separately with the responsibility 
of a "carrier", defined as one who makes a "contract of carriage of goods by sea" 
and an "actual carrier", defined as one to whom all or part of''the performance of 
the carriage has been entrusted',44. Hamburg IO(a) provides that the contracting 
carrier "remains responsible for the entire carriage" even though all or part of the 
carriage "has been entrusted to another carrier". This modernisation of rules 
governing transhipment between ocean carriers has been one of the many measures 
in the Hamburg Rules to lessen the disparity between the responsibility of ocean 
carriers and other modes of transport carriers45 . 
9. The preparation of uniform law for intermodal transport, transport which links 
different modes of transport together as transport on road, rail, air and sea, has been 
impeded by the wide disparity between the responsibilities of ocean carriers and 
other modes of transport carriers. Because of the successful development in 1978 of 
the Hamburg Rules, it was possible in 1980 to conclude an International 
Convention on Multimodal Transport46 (Convention on International Multimodal 
Transport of Goods). 
Besides the solutions listed above, there is still one other remarkable innovation, the 
compulsory jurisdiction provisions provided for in Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules 47 . 
When mentioning the innovations of the Hamburg Rules one should also refer to the 
systematic structure of the convention. With regard to the structure and definitions of 
legal terms, the rules follow the more abstract method of the Continental-European 
countries with their civil law traditions than the Hague Rules which were more 
influenced by contract and bills of lading clauses. 
5. Assessment of the innovations 
Since the adoption of the Hamburg Rules in 1978, a lot has been debated and written 
about them - some of it is vehemently in favour of the Hamburg Rules, some of it and 
vehemently against. 
What everyone seems to agree on is that the Hague Rules are no longer sufficient to 
meet the demands of modem conditions of ocean carriage, that the Visby amendments 
standing alone are some improvements; and that the Hamburg Rules are a mixed bag 
43 for further three (additional) basis of application see below under heading 8.1.1. 
44 see Gaudalajara Convention and Athena Convention (passenger) of 1974, cited in Herber 92, supra 
27, P.384 
45 Honnold, supra 13, P.87 
46 Honnold, supra 13, P.87 
47 see below heading 8.2.1. 
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of improvements and regressions. Beyond these points, there is however little 
agreement 48 . 
Opponents of the Hamburg Rules describe them as "revolutionary", "radical", and an 
ill-advised product of the "economic warfare" mentality of developing countries 49 . 
Proponents of the Hamburg Rules view them as a welcome change, signifying a more 
equitably distribute risk of loss between carriers and cargo. 
While predominately approved ofby lawyers, the economy sector rejects them50, and it 
is exactly this fact that generates vague objections from economic circles participating 
in maritime law, since the legislation- especially at that relating to trade law- is surely 
not exclusively or even primary the business oflawyers. This suspicion is easily 
corroborated by the view that the civil servants of the international agencies supported 
by the innovation seeking scientists were only acting to create something new. New 
rules are always a challenge for the economy, even when the old ones have not been 
successful; each amendment of existing rules already causes loss of time, power and 
money and bears risks51 . 
Consequently, amendments deserve an elaborate examination. But it is a 
crucial question , which criteria should be employed to assess the new rules. The main 
criteria must be whether the new rules improve the performance of maritime trade 
operations to the benefit of world trade and facilitate the settlement of international 
contracts. 
So, no doubt that the considerations of efficiency and cost effectiveness do play an 
important role52. 
Furthermore the opinion exists, that equity and fairness are not tasks of a liability 
regime53 and should be excluded as criteria. This, however, misconstrues one of the 
main functions of law, namely to achieve legal peace among the contractparties. This 
can only be generated by balancing the mutual rights and obligations in marine cargo 
liability regimes and the risk-allocations. Otherwise, an unbalanced regime leads to 
dissatisfaction by one party and eventually to a rejection of the regime54. Hence, equity 
and fairness are also requirements for a liability regime55 
From the judicial point of view one also has to look at the clarity and certainty of the 
law, the contribution to uniform international rules, and to aspects of legal policy. 
48 Douglas A. Werth "The Hamburg Rules Revisited-A Look at U.S. Options" in Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce 1991, P.59(69) (herein "Werth") 
49 Frederick, supra 12, P. 69 
50 Herber 92, supra 27, P. 381 
51 Herber 92, supra 27, P. 381 
52 Herber 92, supra 27, P. 385; Honnold, supra 13, P. 75; Liiddeke, supra 20, P.14 
53 Liiddeke, supra 20, P. 14 
54 Honnold, supra 13, P. 75 for the consideration of equity and fairness 
55 William Tetley "Package & Kilo Limitations and The Hague, HagueNisby and Hamburg Rules & 
Gold" in Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1995, P. 133(133), (herein Tetley 95) 
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By taking these criteria into account a discussion follows of the most controversial 
points: 
5.1. Additional court cases and legal costs 
The most persistent criticism of the Hamburg Rules is that the proposed Rules too 
readily discard existing law and that their novelty will lead to increased claims 
settlement and litigation costs, or so-called "friction"56 . Their language were novel, 
unclear, and unknown to the maritime law. The rules would mean a drawback and the 
maritime community would be throwing away the work of clarification done by the 
courts over the years and would be creating uncertainty and ambiguity in areas where 
none existed before57. 
This argument shows, however, that the Hague and Visby themselves in the past have 
caused a huge amount of litigation. So, obviously the fault lies in Hague-Visby Rules. 
There is a consensus, that the Hague Rules failed to address several points- including 
the carrier's responsibility during custody before and after loading, the modem 
contract that do not qualify as document of title, and the law applicable to inbound 
shipments58 . These points triggered the necessity for litigation. 
On the other hand the Hague's long list of defences and complicated burden of proof 
provisions have created uncertainty and litigation59 . It is really doubtful whether it is 
correct in saying that cargo owner knows under the Hague Rules which risk is 
excluded and which risk his insurance covers. These questions have occupied the 
courts plenty of times. Hamburg has eliminated most of the Hague defences and 
adopted a unitary fault standard, coupled with simplified burden of proof rules. The 
provisions might be abstract but they make it easier for the cargo owner to attribute 
loss or damage to the carrier in the case of negligence. This might reduce litigation and 
other "friction" costs at least in the long term. 
Besides that, the existing court decisions are not a guarantee for certainty in the future, 
firstly, since they are only applicable in the issued country, and secondly, because over 
and over again cases with new and different facts can arise which need to be litigated; 
the testing of rules and regulations is an ongoing process where time and new points of 
view may change earlier judgements. Even old arguments are not free of being 
reopened with new and startling results. 
Furthermore, only the experienced shippers and consignees with access to very 
competent maritime lawyers have an understanding of the controversial points held by 
56 Frederick, supra 12, P. 70 
57 Diamond ( cited by Frederick, supra 12, P. 70 or Diamond "The Hague-Visby Rules, 1978 Lloyd's 
Mar. & Com.L.Q.225,263); IUMI, supra 33, P. 7 
58 for further examples see Honnold, supra 13, Fn 92 
59 Frederick, supra 12, P. 73 
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the courts60 . It is said, that the value of the case-law is not its clarity but its ambiguity 
as a basis for plausible but questionable resistance to cargo claims61 . 
One also has to take into account that the Hamburg Rules were not made out of whole 
new cloth, but rather embody to a large extent, wording, language and legal concepts 
from the Hague Rules and Visby Amendments62; it has been modelled on the Harter 
Act63, the Warsaw Convention to carriage of air ( application and liability64) with their 
voluminous amount of case law, and on the CMR Convention to carriage by road with 
which the carriers, insurers and cargo owners have lived for over 30 years without 
mayor controversy and with very little litigation65 . Thus , much interpretative case law 
exists which fleshes out the language of Hamburg. Also the decisions on whether the 
carrier exercised due care of the cargo, as contrasted with fault and neglect applicable 
under Hamburg Rules will be equally useful under Hamburg. 
The argument that the Hamburg Rules will increase litigation by altering years of time-
honoured tradition, is always advanced by those who oppose change. But when 
shortfalls and eventually inequity exists, the argument that the current regime is "time-
honoured" is not the only reason to permit its continuance. 
To sum up, it is of course difficult to predict whether additional court cases will be 
triggered after the Hamburg rules comes into effect. There are some convincing 
arguments that this will not happen to the degree it has happened with the Hague 
Rules. Nevertheless, there are some new clauses which will need to be interpreted and 
it is a common view that the language of Hamburg is not always clear66 . The reason 
was the urge to find compromises for the settling of disputes. 
Unclear language certainly gives space for different interpretations. But it is not always 
a unclear phrase or sentence which causes problems. From some essays written on the 
Hamburg Rules it emerges that the abstract style of the Rules raises problems for 
lawyers and authors with a common law background. Especially the technique for 
interpreting a single provision in the light of the other rules isn't familiar to them. 
When Art 5. 1 of the Hamburg Rules, for instance, says, that the carrier has to prove 
that with regard to loss or damage he " ... took all measures that could reasonably be 
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences ... " it implies, that he has to 
prove that after an occurrence which causes damage he also must prevent further 
damage. His duty to exercise proper care doesn't stop with the occurrence but 
60 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, figure 39; the report is from 1987 and contains additional to the 
historical background of the Hamburg Rules a report about the economical and commercial 
implications of the entry into force of the Hamburg Rules and a article-by- article commentary on the 
Hamburg Rules 
61 Honnold, supra 13, P. 102 
62 see the 'container clause' of Hamburg (Article 6.2.(a)) and Hague-Visby (Article IV 5(c) or their 
'loss of right to limit the liability clauses' of Hamburg (Article 8.1) and Hague-Visby (Art IV 5 e), 
which are nearly identical 
63 see above under heading 2.3. 
64 Booysen, supra 2, P. 262/263 
65 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, figure 35; Mr Justice Mustillhas, cited in UNCTAD Report, supra 18, 
figure 41 
66 Rolf Herber, cited by Liiddeke, supra 20, P. 12; William Tetley "The Hamburg Rules-A 
commentary" 1979 in Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly, P. 1(5) (herein "Tetley-com") 
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continues beyond it. This commitment is a result of the carriers obligation towards the 
goods in his possession and is a ground rule of the Hamburg Rules. By taking this into 
account it shouldn't be a problem to interpret this rule in a proper way67 . Or, giving 
another example, when Art 8 of the Hamburg Rules says that " ... the carrier is not 
entitled to the benefit of the limitation ... " when he has caused damage " ... with the 
intent ... or recklessly and with knowledge ... " it is surprising that this wording could be 
considered unclear68 . The civil law has used this kind of phrase for centuries without 
any particular problems. 
It generally is a problem to draft international rules which are to be applicable to 
Continental-European countries with civil law background as well as to countries with 
common law backgrounds like in the Anglo-American legal sphere. But it is agreed 
that international conventions are necessary69, than the common law must make the 
sacrifice to agree to the application of provision formulated in an abstract style, since 
this seems to be the suitable kind of establishing conventions. While the application of 
precedent cases is far more developed in common law countries, the countries with 
civil law have more experience to create conventions. 
For applying conventions one should consult the special technique provided by certain 
common understanding provisions. The interpretation of the Hamburg Rules is 
facilitated by the Common Understanding provision70 . Even if this is not law, it points 
the direction for interpreting controversial provisions. Interpretations start with the 
wording and the context of the provision, but the intention of the drafters must be 
considered. It is helpful that Unctad as a co-author of the Hamburg Rules has 
published a booklet with explanations, clarifications and an article by article discussion. 
In this booklet Unctad refers in this booklet to the preparatory and final work of the 
conference 71. 
5.2. Increase of transport costs 
It is also said that Hamburg's shift of risk ofloss from cargo interests to carriers, along 
with the increased "friction" costs (increase claim settlement, litigation costs), will 
result in greater overall insurance costs, for which the ultimate consumer will 
eventually pay 72. The shift in risk ofloss to carriers will result in higher P&I insurance 
costs with or without a corresponding reduction in cargo insurance rates. The shift 
will be detrimental to developing countries since, while they compete in the cargo 
insurer markets, they do not insure carrier risks and thus will lose business as risks shift 
from cargo to carrier73 . 
To examine these concerns, one has to consider, that the transport insurance can 
simply be divided between either cargo insurance taken out by cargo interests with 
67 Adv. D. J. Shaw "The Hamburg Rules" on the occasion of a seminar to the Hamburg Rules 1991, 
seems to have a problem with this rule, P. 8 (herein "Shaw") 
68 Liiddeke, supra 20, P. 27 
69 this seems to exist, see below under heading 7 
70 Annex II of the Hamburg Rules 
71 Liiddeke, supra 20, P.13 
72 Werth, supra 48, P.71 
73 Werth, supra 48, Fn 80 
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cargo insurance companies or liability insurance taken out by carriers mainly through 
their mutual P&I Clubs. In practice, loss or damage to cargo is in the first place 
indemnified by the cargo insurer and the role of liability regime is mainly to determine 
the right of recourse of the insurer against the carrier. As the carrier insures his cargo 
liability with his P&I Club, the carriage of goods often involves overlapping insurance 
coverage. Other authors maintain that the expression of a "dual system of insurance" 
would be better 74, since there are some cases where the liability insurer will not be 
involved because the carrier is really not liable, or because the particular risk is not 
covered by the P&I Club, or because cargo insurance covers specified events 
irrespective of any liability towards a third party, or because cargo owner has not taken 
out cargo insurance. 
With regard to the concerns of the cargo insurer in loosing business one has to note 
that even with the likely shift of risk of loss to carriers does not mean that the 
Hamburg Rules make the shipowner liable for all cargo loss or damage without any 
limitation. Specific limitations still exist, such as war, riots, civil commotion. Even 
when the carrier can prove that he or his servants are not responsible for the damage 
or loss, than cover by the insurance remains necessary. For this reason it is most likely 
that cargo interests will continue to insure with their cargo insurers. No data or other 
specific information exists or at least are not released by the insurers so far to the 
impact in the amount of insurance written, but it is said that no dramatic reduction by 
the cargo insurers will occur75 . But certainly there will be a change from cargo 
insurance to liability insurance. 
Whether the insurance premiums will go up, down or remaining more or less as before 
is a key issue. To put this question into perspective, it must be taken into account, that 
the amount of premiums only amounts to one quarter percent of the landed value of 
the goods shipped76 . 
One has to note that the coming into force of the Hamburg Rules will not change the 
total risk, nor will it result in more loss of or more damage to cargo. It might rather 
result in less damage since shipowners might be induced to take better care of their 
cargos owing to the increase in their liability. Consequently the total compensation 
paid will either remain unchanged or will decrease with the lower amount of damage. 
The debate focuses therefore not so much on the amount but on who will have to pay. 
Because of the slight change in the balance ofliability, which is caused by the 
introduction of the principle of presumed fault, the number of claims against the carrier 
might increase. Consequently the carriers' claim-handling costs would go up and 
possibly higher liability(P&I) insurance costs would occur. This again could result in 
higher premiums for the shipowners. With regard to this chain of causality it must be 
added, as has been said above- that an increase of costs will probably induces the 
shipping companies and the P&I Clubs to pay more attention to the causes of damage 
and force the costs down again through improved loss prevention measures and 
standards of cargo care. In that case cost increases are likely to be temporary. But 
74 UNCT AD Report, supra 18, figure 45 
75 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, figure 47 
76 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, figure 46 
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even an increase in cargo claims in the order of say 25 per cent would produce only a 
relatively small increase in the overall total of cargo claims payable by the liability 
underwriter and on this basis the effect on the overall cost of liability insurance would 
probably not remarkable77 . An investigation has shown that with regards to various 
categories of claims, for example claims for short delivery, cases of routine damage, 
serious damage, damage to cargo in collision and general average, no effect is likely to 
b . d1s e expenence . 
Shipowners and their P&I Clubs fear that because of the moderate though conservative 
shift in the balance of risk from cargo to ship, the P&I Clubs will have to bear a greater 
share of this expense. The fear has reached such an extent, that the P&I insurers 
currently refuse to indemnify their customers for claims if these customers have 
voluntarily accepted the Hamburg rules 79. The fear by the shipowners and the P&I 
Clubs is justified in the case where the cargo insurers make greater use of their 
subrogation rights. But, as shown above, this increase is likely to be temporary until 
prevention measures are improved, and also will not be remarkable in relation to the 
overall costs of liability insurance. 
The fear by cargo insurance companies that they will consequently be faced with the 
reduction of their premiums is realistic, although function will still be needed. 
Nevertheless the fear oflosing stakes by one participant in maritime activity cannot be 
a reason to prevent changes oflaw, especially when this is to the benefit of another 
original participant, here the shipper. Interestingly, insurers have accepted risk-
allocation like Hamburg's under international conventions governing other transport 
modes (e.g., rail, road, air )-apparently because the same segment of the industry 
insures both shippers and carriers80 . 
On the other hand, argument often used against the Hamburg Rules has been that 
while the P&I costs will go up, cargo insurance premiums will not go down and that 
this will increase the total transport cost. 
In reply to the part of statement that the cargo insurance premiums will not go down 81, 
one has to say, that the insurance premiums will either go down or they will remain the 
same, but they cannot do both at the same time. However, it is rather likely that the 
premium will decrease according to the general acceptance that the Hamburg Rules 
may encourage the cargo insurers to use their subrogation rights in greater use of the 
recourse action, a remedy which may even improve their position in settlement 
negotiations where costs are rather small82 . The amount of the premiums depends on 
the risk being borne by the insurance. This is confirmed by the Mercer Management 
Consulting Report " Legal Liability in Maritime Transport with Particular Reference to 
Short Sea Shipping and the Hamburg Rules" prepared in 1994, which figured that it is 
likely that shippers will be able to reduce their cargo insurance coverage, and/or accept 
77 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, figure 49, cited Goldie 
78 C.W.H. Goldie "Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners' Liability Insurance" in Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce 1993, P. 111(113-115) (herein "Goldie") 
79 IUMl, supra 33, P. 8 
80 Honnold, supra 13, P. 106 
81 so the International Chamber of Commerce, cited by Liidekke, supra 20, P. 18 
82 UNCTAD Report, supra 18, P.57 
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increased deductibles in exchange for lower insurance rates83 . A decrease of risk must 
result in a decrease in premiums. This development would be only fair. A statement 
that it is unlikely that the premiums will reduce84, must be seen rather as a attempt to 
prevent the introduction of the Hamburg Rules, especially if it comes from the 
insurance side. An increase of the total transport cost is thus not expected from this 
sight. 
An increase of the transport costs through higher premium costs charged by P&I and 
subsequently higher freight cost is likely to take place only temporarily, but even this is 
questionable. When assessing an increase of costs one has to consider two other 
factors which may have meaningful influences. Firstly, it is likely that over the coming 
years the volume of claims will increase whether or not the Hamburg Rules are 
adopted and secondly that P&I Clubs cover even claims other than those for cargo loss 
or damage and that these claims will also increase from year to year. The four main 
types of risks covered by P&I Clubs are 
(a) Liability for loss oflife and personal injury, 
(b) Liability for loss of or damage to cargo, 
( c) ¼ collision liability, and 
( d) Wreck removal, damage to fixed objects, oil pollution, etc. 
Of the risk covered by the P&I Clubs, the payment of cargo claims amount to 30 per 
cent of the total. Since cargo risks play such a relatively limited role in the total risks 
assumed by the P&I Clubs, their implications for liability insurance are limited. An 
increase of cargo claims by 20 to 30 per cent would cause an increase of the total 
claims reimbursed to shipowner by 6 to 9 per cent85 . Such an increase again will 
influence liner freight rates from 0.2 to 0.4 per cent of the total freight rate86 . In this 
connection it must also borne in mind that P&I Clubs are in general more cost 
effective, being mutual and non-profit-making than cargo insurance companies. From a 
purely economic point of view, it would seem that P&I Clubs are the more efficient 
type of organisation. Risks may consequently be covered relatively more cheaply under 
P&I insurance than under cargo insurance and the limited shift in liability may result in 
either no change or a reduction in total insurance costs. 
This argument finds support in the fact, that the introduction of the Hamburg Rules has 
more influence on smaller than on "major" cases. ''Major" claims are unavoidable no 
matter which legal rules apply. Smaller cases, however, have much less effect on the 
overall cost of cargo claims. 
In an attempt to avoid costs an interesting proposal has been made that cargo insurers 
and ship owner's liability insurers should agree to formulae in advance for the 
allocation ofloss in specified categories of claims, and there would be no-recourse 
agreements backing up those formulae so that the cargo insurer would not attempt to 
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recover from the liability insurer amounts in excess of what would be provided in the 
formulae 87. 
To sum up, it is doubtful whether the alteration of the Hague Rules system will result 
in any increase of the total insurance and transport costs. The Mercer Report's final 
statement is that because the cost ofliability insurance is only a small part of a carrier's 
cost structure, and because of carriers' effort to reduce loss and damage, this should 
have no effect, or a negligible effect, on freight rates overall. Carriers, they 
interviewed, expect limited impact on freight rates as a result of a possible changeover 
to the Hamburg Rules. 
5.3. Liability period 
The extension of the carrier's period of responsibility to the duration while the carrier 
is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of 
discharge according to Article 4(1) of the Hamburg Rules entails the advantage of 
having the same approach as that for the international conventions for carriage by 
road, rail, and air88. This is a valuable amendment towards establishing uniform 
international rules on carriers' responsibility. 
The ''tackle to tackle" principle of the Hague Rules reflects early patterns in which the 
shipper brought goods to the dock as the ship was ready to load and the consignee 
received the goods as they were unloaded89. The period in which neither the shipper 
was in possess of the goods nor the carrier responsible was minimal. Nowadays, at 
busy ports, a delivery of goods to the dock is not feasible anymore. By applying the 
Hague Rules it means that the shipper has to give up his possession sometime long 
before the goods are loaded without anybody else being responsible when they are 
damaged or lost. To exclude the periods while the carrier is in charge of the goods 
generates a risk for the shipper which is not bearable and not even necessary. Cargo 
losses from weather and theft are more common in the freight-yards than while cargo 
is in the ship90 . The carrier can even in compliance with the Hamburg Rules enter into 
an agreement that a third party be responsible for the custody before loading and after 
carriage. But once he is in possession of the goods it is a principles of equity that he is 
responsible for the damage or loss. The obligation to take care of goods in one's 
possession reaches such an importance in some jurisdictions that courts are inclined to 
refuse the validity of an exoneration clause concerning responsibility of possession 
even without an application of the Hamburg Rules91 . The necessity of the Hamburg 
Rules seems to be self- evident and compelling. 
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5.4. Application of the liability regime even without the issue of a bill of 
lading 
Hague Rules apply accordingly to 1 (b) only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill 
of lading or any similar document of title. The reason for this limitation is to restrict 
coverage to carriage under a document that must be surrendered in exchange for the 
goods, this being a useful way for sellers ( and banks) to keep control of the goods until 
the price has been paid92. The increased speed of ocean transport and current payment 
and financing arrangements have led to shipment under contracts ( often called 
''waybills") that do not require the contract to be surrendered before the goods can be 
unloaded and delivered, this a development that avoids difficulties in delivery that may 
result from delayed arrival or loss of a "document of title"93 . Nevertheless the shipper 
needs protection when goods are damaged or lost. While there is an uncertainty about 
whether Hague or the various domestic laws are applicable to modem contracts of 
carriage, this problem is avoided by Hamburg since it applies to any contract of 
carriage without regard to whether a document of title must be issued, according to 
Article 1.6. The demand for clarity and certainty necessitates this. 
5.5. Deck cargo 
The extension of the liability on deck cargo flows from an economic requirement94. In 
recent times the exclusion of deck cargo was justified because of the enhanced danger 
the cargo was exposed to on deck. In modem times - with containerism - this danger is 
minimised. Besides that , there is no danger of heavy duty of care for the carrier since 
the liability is based on fault which again depends on the specific circumstances of the 
deck cargo, which includes a consideration of what care is appropriate and the usual 
customs. 
5.6. Liability of the "Actual Carrier" 
The modernisation of the rules governing transhipment between ocean carriers has 
been one of many measures in the Hamburg Rules to lessen the disparity between the 
responsibility of ocean carriers and other modes of transport. Hence, Hamburg 
provides uniform international rules. The solution responds to the fact that, although 
most shipper cannot cope with claims against unknown remote parties, carriers can 
effectively handle this problem as part of their on-going relationships with each other. 
5. 7. Liability for nautic fault of the servants 
One of the major complaints about the Hamburg Rules is that the list of defences has 
been eliminated except for fire. The most vocal complaint has been over the 
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elimination of the nautical faults defence. This defence was originally included in the 
Hague Rules because the so-called "maritime adventure" of ocean transport in the past 
was indeed an uncertain affair fraught with danger. However, there is a vast difference 
between the perils of trading under sail without modern navigational aids and today's 
methods using highly sophisticated vessels and satellite navigation95 . The vessel can 
.communicate with the carrier at any time96 . Modern satellite communication, telex and 
telephone places owners in daily contact with their vessels, whose masters would not 
take any important decision without first having consulted their head office97 . This, of 
course, doesn't mean that the idea of presumed fault is that the master first calls his 
head office when the vessel is in a severe storm or hurricane or in a difficult 
navigational or collision situation98 . In this situation the master is on his own, but this 
is rather an exceptional occasion. But for most of his decisions the master can get 
confirmation and is rather executing by instruction. The increased influence by the 
carrier justify making him responsible. 
That safety has increased dramatically can be seen, for example, in the shipowner 
requiring fewer and fewer crewmembers per vessel99. 
Consequently, the Hague Rules' "errors in navigation" defence is no longer 
reasonable100 . 
If not the law itself would provide the exoneration, like the Hague rules, the German 
courts would hold such an agreement anyhow void as a violation of cardinal 
obligations101, and this despite the freedom of contract. No doubt exist under German 
Law that the guarantee of proper nautical carrying out of carriage on sea is a cardinal 
obligation and that the carrier therefore is responsible for fault of his master and 
servants. 
The liability isn't a strict one but depends on fault. So there always remains 
possibilities to defend the behaviour of the servants which caused the damage as 
reasonable apart from negligence . 
No doubt exists that the carriage by sea is exposed to specific perils and that it carries 
a high risk because of the immense value of the goods. But to justify the defences of 
the Hague Rules with these circumstances does have persuasive force, since this fact is 
already considered in the limitation ofliability based on a very low amount. This 
amount is approximately just one fourth of the sum in the CMR Convention (Carriage 
by road) and one eighths of the sum in the CIM Convention(Carriage ofrail)102. 
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In this context it should be mentioned that the Hamburg Rules introduced the burden 
of proof under Article 5(1) in reaction of Hague's silence on this matter which led to 
conflicting case-law and international disharmony103 
The opponents of the presumed faults provision refer to the possibility of transport 
insurance and one has to agree that the insurability of a risk has to be taken into 
account by the legislator. However, this fact cannot justify a unbalanced rule. The legal 
rule has to lead to an acceptable result even without insurance104. This requires at the 
same time a determination, who has to carry the costs for the insurance. 
A further argument against the extensive defence possibilities under the Hague Rules 
is that it results in diminished standards of care and uneconomic results since the 
carrier need not care about other things since no danger exists for which he has to pay. 
There is no incentive for the carrier to make outlays that are needed for the safe 
carriage. Carrier answer that adequate incentives are provided by their interest in 
protecting the investment in the ship105 . This interest may provide incentive to have 
radar, sonar, and other navigational aids to avoid collision and stranding. This however 
doesn't include care to prevent seepage or "bleeding" of sea-water into cargo holds, 
care in adequate stowage to prevent shifting of cargo in heavy weather, or care in 
adequate securing of on-deck containers. A current report observes that large claims 
have recently resulted from a lowering of standards in officers and crews as well as 
their inadequate training106. 
The responsibility for nautical fault and the abolishment of the majority of the defence 
possibilities could, however, induce the carriers' companies to improve loss prevention 
measures and standards of cargo care. 
5.8. Inbound shipments and "conflict" vagaries 
A further contribution to clarity and uniformity is provided by Article 2 of Hamburg by 
making the Convention applicable, when either ''the port of loading or the port of 
discharge" is in a Contracting State. This avoids the uncertainties resulted from judicial 
attempts to invoke conflict rules when the shipment came from a non-Contracting 
State to a Contracting State of Hague and the forum is a third State. 
5.9. Jurisdiction clause 
Most standard bills of lading restrict the place where the cargo-owners may bring suit 
for cargo loss. The most common provision limits actions to the country ''where the 
carrier has his principal place ofbusiness"107. The Hague Rules do not address the 
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difficult problems of validity presented by these clause. The clause is in favour of the 
convenience of the carrier and to reduce cost of litigation "at home". 
Cargo loss or damage usually is not discovered until the cargo is unloaded at 
destination, which may be thousands of miles from the carrier's principal place of 
business. Thus, the standard bill oflading clauses often place on the claimant the 
burden and expense of transporting the evidence and of instituting its claim before a 
distant, foreign tribunal. Because of the heavy costs of litigating in a distant forum 
many courts with reference to Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules have invalidated these 
forum clauses 108 . 
The uncertainty and unfair situation for the shipper have been solved by the Hamburg 
rules insofar as the shipper also can sue the carrier, for instance, according to Art 21 
(3) at "the port ofloading or the port of discharge". Consequently, neither party may 
institute a proceeding that is unconnected with the contract or its performance. These 
provisions are designed to bring fairness and also clarity to an unpredictable area of 
international commercial law. It also generates uniformity since the other international 
transport conventions have the same rules. The rule also doesn't limit the freedom of 
contract beyond the necessary extent, since the Hamburg Rules give full effect to 
agreement at the place of proceedings made after a claim under the contract for 
carriage by sea has arisen according to 21 ( 5) with regard to legal actions and 
according to 22( 6) with regard to arbitration. 
5.10. Monetary Ceilings on Liability 
Cargos vary widely in their value per package or pound. The Hague Rules ceilings 
were set for recovery for cargo losses to minimise costs for insuring cargo and carrier 
liability and to create some certainty in commercial relations. The carrier knows what 
the limit of his exposure are, and can insure himself accordingly, and the cargo owner 
knows what his maximum recovery will be, and he can purchase insurance if he wants 
protection against losses in excess of the limitation figure. The ceiling consist of a 
cargo unit and a monetary limit. 
One of the major sources of the lack of uniformity in the carriage of goods by sea 
under bills oflading arises from different package and kilo limitations. There are at 
least nine package and kilo limitation regimes in the world today109, which is also a 
consequence of paragraph II of the sign protocol, whereby the parties of the Hague 
Rules were free either to adopt them word-to-word or by giving the gist ofthemIIo_ 
Hague omitted to define "package" or ''unit". This has created a number of 
problems111 . With the container revolution" a new dimension to the problem was 
created. The Visby Protocol has already faced this problem which is solved by the 
Hamburg Rules by Article 6 which recognise two cargo units for setting liability limits. 
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The monetary limit for each cargo as "100 pounds sterling" according to Hague 4(5), 
caused uncertainty and has been replaced according to Art. 6 of Hamburg which 
employs a widely-recognised international standard-unit of account defined as Special 
drawing Rights(SDRs) administered by the International Monetary Fund(IMF), the 
same as the SDR Protocol apply. This led to certainty and accountability of the 
financial limit regardless of the sites of the proceeding112. 
The rules of Hamburg to the monetary ceiling of liability was the result of a package 
deal 113 . Against the abolishing of the defence of nautical fault a very low amount of 2.5 
SDRs was agreed. Considering the inflation of 10 years one has to admit that this 
amount is lower than the amount agreed in the Visby Protocol with 2 SDR. Already 
this agreement should calm those concerned with an increase in indemnity costs for the 
carrier. It even shows that the Hamburg Rules do not overly favour cargo owners 114. 
5.11. Efficiency and Fairness 
The different issues dealing with certainty and clarity as mentioned above also touch 
upon the question of fairness: especially for clauses in the Hague Rules which require 
shippers to bring their claims in the carriers' jurisdiction; clauses in the Hague Rules 
that in cases of transhipment shippers are required to pursue their claims against a 
second or third carrier, not identified in the bill of lading; rules require shippers to bear 
the burden of proving facts that are only in the carrier's possession. 
Besides that, it couldn't be described as fair that the carriers are able to cling to the 
Hague Rules with its multitude of immunities and defences, with their related 
ambiguity and elasticity providing immunity and negligence. 
If at all, the fact that uncertainty is generated raises the question of fairness, since this 
gives the possibility to delay or defeat cargo claims through tenuous legal 
technicalities. Carriers' companies are rather able to afford legal advisers and legal 
actions than the smaller shipper companies, so that sometimes only a threat to bring a 
matter to court is deterrence enough for the shipper to drop any complains. 
One cannot reproach Hague's founders for these failures. It is the fact, that seventy 
years ago many of the problems had not arisen or had not yet reached crisis 
proportions as seen in containerisation and combined transport, custody at 
intermediate transfer-points, persistent world-wide inflation, and widespread use of 
non-negotiable contracts of carriage. The less a convention is abstract the bigger its 
chance to become outdated115 . 
Legal uncertainties, as shown above, create waste; elements of increased costs include 
delays in settlement, expensive legal services, overlapping insurance and unnecessary 
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casualty losses, while immunity is given to the only party who could guard against 
losses 116. 
Besides the fact of some unclear phrases caused by the necessity to compose different 
views of a liability regime and the low monetary ceiling as a consequence of the 
package deal 117, the Hamburg Rules seem to improve the performance of maritime 
trade operations and to facilitate the settlement of international contracts compared 
with the Hague Rules. This is reached by rules which at least persuade in content 
through clarity and certainty, considering modern developments and contributing to 
uniform international rules. In many respect the Hamburg Rules are necessary to meet 
modern requirements and there is no other legal regime which unites so many positive 
aspects. Nevertheless the number of ratifications is low especially amongst the 
important maritime countries and question remains what further development will be 
whether a uniform regime is necessary at all, what kind of problems arise because of 
the existence of different liability regimes, and how to achieve uniform law. 
6. Further development 
The ratification of the Hamburg Rules appears slow. Just 25 States have ratified 
them118 . The majority of these countries are developing countries. Member States as 
Botswana, Cameroon, Hungary, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia haven't yet incorporated 
the Rules into their national legislation119. 
At present, the impact of the Hamburg Rules on world trade seems to be negligible. 
The Hague-Visby States control about 35% world's fleet by dead weight tonnage and 
about 65% of world trade. Hamburg Rules States control respectively only about 1,5% 
of the world fleet and only 3,2% of world trade120. 
A report of the 1995 Transport Committee of the OECD indicates that it is unrealistic 
to believe that the major trading countries will ratify the Hamburg Rules in the near 
future121 . 
Nevertheless, it is true that Canada, by enactment of the Carriage of Goods by Water 
Act, which came into force on 6 May 1993, has adopted the Hague-Visby Rules. But 
the same act adopted the Hamburg Rules, which will come into force when the 
minister of Transport of Canada, on or before, 31 December 1999, has considered 
their adoption under inclusion of the parliament122. 
In Australia the Hamburg Rules could even come into force at midnight on 19 October 
1997 unless both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament resolve before then that 
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they should be repealed or that consideration of their repeal should be postponed a 
further three years, until the year 2000123 . 
France has adopted the Hague-Visby Rules, but under the declaration, that it would be 
only for transition 124. Its tight connection to African Countries, especially Morocco, 
who have adopted the Hamburg Rules, could be significant125 . 
Anyhow, it is common view, that hesitation in adoption can at least partly be explained 
in light of a general belief towards international conventions affect the economy, and 
that the states wait to see whether the convention will come into force at all or even 
how other states with similar conditions react126. One must also consider the long time 
an adoption takes within a democracy127. 
But despite that fact, the number of ratifications after 19 years is truly very small. This 
may be explained by the strong resistance which some institution with enormous 
influence have against the Rules. In a bulletin issued by the Baltic and International 
Maritime Counsel (BIMCO), members of the organisation have advised that the pro-
Hamburg campaign by shippers must be resisted 128. 
The opposition by the P&I Clubs is expressed by their refusal to give cover for 
voluntarily inclusions of the Hamburg Rules129. 
The Association of Marine Underwriters in South Africa (AMUSA) have expressed 
their opposition through a paper by its chairman130. 
Support from shipper organisations, like the European Shippers' Counsel (ESC)131, is 
relatively low, since the small reduction of premiums being expected keeps their 
interest low. Besides that, it is the bad state of the organisation of cargo interests 
which is up against the well organised carriers. 
Even the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) rejects the introduction of 
Hamburg Rules and urges the United Nations to use all its efforts to promote a wider 
adherence to the Hague Visby Rules 132. It maintains, due to the small number of 
ratifications, the Hamburg Rules have proven that they have failed commercially133 . 
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CMI was never a promoter of Hamburg but yet only a couple of years after the 
adoption it recommended their ratification because of reasons of uniformity. 
Meanwhile they have switched to an opposite position. 
But it is questionable whether the long period before the convention came into effect 
and the small number of ratifications already obtained, indicates its eventual failure. It 
took also seven years until the Hague Rules came into effect with just a small number 
of ratifications, and 9 years for the Visby Protocol after just 10 ratifications came into 
effect134. 
Even the fact that countries adopt the Visby-Protocol long after the acceptance of the 
Hamburg Rules doesn't mean an absolute rejection ofHamburg135 ; France serves as 
example136. Other countries who in the meantime have introduced the Hague Rules are 
South Africa (04.07.1986), and Italy(0l .11.86); Germany has on 05.06.1986 written 
the Hague-Visby regime into their commercial law. Just Japan declared by ratification 
of the Visby-Protocol that it refuses each increase of the carrier's liability. 
It is general view that the prevailing Hague Rules even with the amendments by the 
Visby Protocol needs further amendments137. The opinions are not agreed about what 
path should be followed. Should there be an adoption of the Hamburg Rules or a 
second protocol comparable to the Visby one, or a autonomous developing on State 
basis, or a new convention at all? Some recent developments in single States now 
follows. 
6.1. United States 
The United States does not belong to the traditional big maritime nations in terms of 
fleets, but it has some huge harbours ( Long Beach with 74, Philadelphia with 68, and 
Los Angeles with 67 millions tonnes goods138). It plays a major role in international 
trade as one of the biggest import as well as export countries. The United States is 
influenced rather by shipper than by carrier organisations, and hence it isn't surprising 
that it gave the international impulse for improving the situation of the shippers by 
introduction of the Harter Act139. Besides that it was the United States, amongst other 
industrial states, who promoted the drafting of the Hamburg Rules140. So, it wasn't a 
surprise, when the United States was deemed as one of the first nations to adopt the 
Hamburg Rules141 . Nevertheless, the ratification is still pending. Yet it is important to 
keep in mind that in 1936 the United States adopted the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
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(COGSA), which is the domestic enactment of the Hague Rules, but has not yet 
adopted the Visby Protocol. 
The struggle in the United States to ratify Hamburg seems to be exemplary for the 
occurrences in other countries: rigid opposition by the carrier and weak support by the 
shipper organisations. The first stage was characterised by the search for reliable data 
on whether the adoption really led to higher costs as the opponents of Hamburg had 
asserted. The search remained without success 142 . It is interesting to know that 
carriers seek to justify the negligent navigation defence as essential to risk allocation 
with that being the rational behind insurance of Lloyd's. The distribution of the cargo 
damage risks on many syndicates would mean a spread within the entire society instead 
of concentrating on one source offunds143 as it would mean when the P&I Clubs had 
to cover the loss or damage. 
While not surprised by opposition of the carrier organisations and the liability insurer, 
the big surprise-as in other countries- is the opposition by the cargo insurer. While one 
could have assumed that they might favour the Hamburg Rules because of the 
subrogated rights of shippers which eventually could produce greater returns for them, 
the fear predominated that the transfer of risks from shipper to carrier would be the 
beginning of rejection of cargo insurance and a diminishing in premiums and 
business 144. 
Another phenomena with regard to the adoption of Hamburg which occurred with 
conventions in the United States, was what has been called the "Trigger-effect". This 
described an agreement among protagonists, that the ratification shall follow after a 
great number of ratifications by trading partners of the United States 145 . The 
consequence of having no ratification so far can not surprise, since many countries 
thought in the same way. 
Furthermore, the special situation in the United States of not having adopted the Visby 
Protocol gave the opponents to Hamburg a tool of being progressive by demanding its 
ratification. This, however, was blocked by the proponents of Hamburg with their 
demand of a simultaneous ratification of both Visby and Hamburg with the 
consequence that Hamburg would come into effect automatically after a period of 
time. The contrary proposals led to a stalemate which has produced governmental 
inaction and prompted government to let the maritime industry solve its own 
problems 146 . 
Also the alliance among shipper organisations in and beyond the United States with 
UNCTAD and UNCITRAL147, which eventually lead to a conference in Geneva in 
1987, remained without result148. 
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Because of the widespread view hat COGS A and the Hague Rules were outdated, The 
Maritime Law Association of the United States sought to break this long-standing 
deadlock and proposed a solution aimed as a compromise to find the acceptance to all 
affected interests in the maritime industry 149. Interestingly the members of the Study 
Group in charge of drafting the act were not representatives of particular 
organisations involved in maritime matters, although they tried to approach the project 
from the points of view of the participants in the relevant commercial transactions150. 
The work was completed in 1995 and submitted to the members of the Maritime Law 
Association for comment. In 1995 and 1996 meetings were sponsored throughout the 
country to introduce and discuss the proposals. It is now intended to represent it to the 
US congress. 
The Maritime Law Association itself describes in the Final Report of the proposed bill, 
that the framework is that already established by the Hague Rules and continued in the 
Hague-Visby Rules 151 . It would be better suited to the modern needs of the 
commercial world. The main characteristics are the incorporation of the Hague-Visby 
package on kilo limitation and the abolition of error in navigation and management 
exceptions. Besides that, there exists some terms not found in any other national or 
international legislation. 
Its similarities to the Hamburg Rules are: the elimination of the tackle-to-tackle 
limitation concerning the time period where the carrier is responsible for the safety of 
the goods according to subsection l(e), the extension of the application of the 
proposed act to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea except charterparties 
according to subsection 1 (b ), and the inclusion of deck carriage within the scope of the 
proposed act. 
Entirely new within a liability regime is the fact, that the bill provides that it shall 
govern the rights and responsibilities of the relevant parties regardless of the form of 
the action or the court in which suit is brought. This should avoid the attempt to evade 
the carrier's limitations and defences by filing suit under headings not in the proposed 
act, for instance actions in bailment or in tort for having damaged the goods. 
The usage of service contracts is not even known in current liability regimes. Its idea is 
to compose the principle of the freedom of contract with the protection of third 
parties. The agreement to increase or even decrease the carrier's liability is binding 
only the immediate parties to that agreement and not third parties. 
Especially because of the elimination of the navigational fault exception it hardly needs 
to be mentioned that both the International Group of the P&I Clubs and the 
International Chamber of Shipping has criticised the draft152. Additionally, in both 
statements, the opinion was made that the timing of submitting the draft would be 
inconvenient since on the international level efforts were being made to create one 
uniform regime. 
149 Maritime Law Association of the United States " Revising The Carriage Of Goods By Sea Act: 
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Liability Rules Study Group, Febr.1996, (herein "Final Report") 
15° Final Report, supra 149, P. 3 
151 Final Report, supra 149, P. 4 
152 William Tetley "The tangled garden" in Fairplay 1 Ith July 1996, P. 22 (herein "Tetley 96") 
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Independently from the success of the bill, it is worthwhile to note that an important 
national player in international trade is attempting to go its own way. 
6.2. China 
China has not only the biggest population in the world with over 1,2 billion people, the 
globe's third largest economy, and one of the largest growing economies with 10% 
annually since 18 years153, but is also a major maritime state with a national fleet of 
over 13 million BRT154. 85-90% of China's foreign trade- China ranks already 11 th in 
export in the world 155 - is carried by sea 156. Because of the size of the fleet a maritime 
Chinese code is of great interest to many world-wide. For a long time China hasn't had 
any particular maritime code nor has she signed one of the more known regimes. 
Because ofthis gap, principles of civil law were applicable to maritime commerce157. 
Although China began to draft a maritime code in 1952158, it took until the 1. July 
1993 when the first code, the Maritime Code of the People's Republic of China, came 
into force. 
The Maritime Code isn't an enactment of one of the current liability regimes, although 
the authors had considered them. Whereas the Hague Rules had too many shortfalls, it 
was the extensive liability of the carrier in the Hamburg Rules which deterred the 
authors from ratifying those Rules 159. Also the low number of states, which had 
ratified the Hamburg Rules influenced the draftsmen. The product is unique, like the 
draft of the Maritime Law Association of the United States, following mainly the 
Hamburg Rules with some Hague Visby provisions and some original provisions. In 
addition, the case law and commentaries of the Anglo-American legal circles was 
invoked 160, and will influence the interpretation and application of the Code in the 
future161 . The terminology is rather local than international162. It is noteworthy that the 
code contains no propaganda of the socialist regime, unlike previous legislation 163 . The 
main goal of the authors was to rather reach a parallel in the provisions in line with the 
international law on the carriage of goods 164. 
153 TIME Magazine March 3, 1997 "The Next China" P. 14(19) 
154 L. Li "The Maritime Code of the People's Republic of China" in Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 1993, P. 204 (herein "Li") 
155 TIME Magazine March 3, 1997 "The Next China" P. 19 
156 Li, supra 154, P. 212 
157 Li, supra 154, P. 204 
158 Li, supra 154, Fn 5 
159 Jens-Peter Fante "Die Haftung des Verfrachters im Seehandelsgestz der Volksrepublik China" in 
Transportrecht 1995, P. 99 (herein "Fante") 
16° Fante, supra 159, P. 104 
161 Li, supra 154, P. 217 
162 Tetley 96, supra 152, P. 22 
163 Li, supra 154, P. 206; Fante, supra 159, P. 104 
164 Fante, supra 159, P. 104 
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The Maritime Code consists of 15 Chapters with 278 Articles165 . The carriage of 
goods is regulated in Chapter 4. The Hamburg Rules have mainly influenced the rules 
about the person as carrier and actual carrier (Art 61), delivery of goods (Art 50), deck 
cargo (Art. 53), rules about the limitation ofliability(but not the amount), and burden 
of proof (Art 51,2). The provision concerning the period of the carrier's responsibility 
is also incorporated following the Hamburg Rules but only to cover container 
transport. With the non-container transport the provisions conform to the Hague-
Visby Rules, just as the amount of the limits of liability. On the other hand the 
Maritime Code has adopted all the exceptions and immunities laid down in Art. IV, r.2 
of the Hague Rules, including thus the defence of nautical fault 166 . But one may 
speculate that China moved by a pragmatic point of view will change this principle and 
adopt Hamburg's presumed fault rule when the majority of the other countries have 
adopted Hamburg167. 
The Maritime Code also provides some special provisions unknown to the other 
conventions, the Hague Rules or the Hamburg Rules. These are the provisions 
concerning voyage charterparties, whereas the Hamburg Rules expressly in Art 2.3 and 
the Hague-Visby Rules through interpretation of Article 1 (b) exclude the application of 
the rules to charterparties168. 
Besides that, the Maritime Code has special provisions on combined transport (Art 
102). Therefore, the Maritime Code may be applicable when within a combined 
transport there is one stage of sea transport. With regard to loss or damage the liability 
provisions of the Maritime Code according to the Rules are applicable either when it 
can be ascertained that the loss or damage occurred in the stage of the carriage on the 
sea or when it cannot be ascertained where it occurred. Only when it can be 
ascertained that the damage or loss occurred during a stage other than that of the 
carriage on sea, the law applicable for such stage will apply169. 
The enactment of the Maritime Code by China confirms a movement in terms of 
liability regimes by countries towards an autonomous development on national levels. 
6.3. Scandinavian countries 
Even the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, have recently 
adopted a carriage of goods law of their own. The Nordic code came into force on 
October 1, 1994. 
165 the English version of the Maritime Code is to find with Wang Guijun "Maritime Law" in China 
&Law, 25 February 1993; the German version can be find with Frank Mfinzel "Seehandelsgesetz der 
VR China" in Chinas Recht 7.11.92/1 Fn 1 
166 Li, supra 154, P. 210 
167 Fante, supra 159, P. 104 
168 these applies in general; however, municipal law in some countries, e.g. Japan, applies the Hague 
Rules to charterparties, see Martineau, supra 22, P. 13 
169 China has been a contracting state to the Warsaw Convention, so1hat with regard to carriage by 
air the Warsaw Convention is applicable 
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The Nordic countries have a long tradition of co-operation on their maritime 
legislation and therefore have almost identical codes170. Although the Nordic countries 
economically have not the same power as the United States or China, it is the union of 
their countries, the size of their fleet and their traditional significant influence on 
international maritime matters which accounts for their influence. 
The Nordic Code is a partial implementation of the Hamburg Rules171 . This isn't a 
major alteration of their old code, the Maritime Code, because the Hamburg Rules 
were taken into consideration when the Hague-Visby Rules were ratified in the 1970s 
and the case law has also tended towards the Hamburg Rules in certain areas 172. From 
the Hague-Visby Rules they retained the package and kilo limitations, the one year 
delay for suit, the error in navigation, and the management and fire exception. The 
Hamburg Rules jurisdiction and arbitration provisions only apply between Nordic 
countries 173 . In terms of terminology it is worthwhile to mention that the Nordic code 
often uses neither Hamburg nor Hague-Visby ones174. 
6.4. Efforts on international level 
Recent developments show that the deadlock in finding a uniform law caused by the 
indecision of many countries leads to autonomous behaviour which results, in national 
laws moving further apart from any uniform liability regime. The state justifies the 
description of this problem as being a "tangled garden"175 . 
Also the attempts by meetings of the shipping industry or private organisations to 
rescue a way towards standardisation has been without success. 
On June 1, 1987 in Geneva, an informal meeting of invited groups from the shipping 
industry met, convened under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and UNCTAD. The groups involved were the U.S. Shippers' National Freight Claim 
Council, the Australian Shippers' Council, the International Shipowners' Association 
(INSA), the International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI), the International Chamber 
of Shipping (ICS), the CMI, the Baltic and International Maritime Committee 
(BIMCO) and the Council of European and Japanese Shipowners' Associations 
(CENSA). Technological change in the industry-especially the movement to eliminate 
the paper bill oflading- was prominent in the Geneva discussion176 . The meeting ended 
without any result. 
170 Trond Eilertson "The Nordic Maritime Codes" in The International Journal of Shipping Law 1996 
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171 Hugo Tiberg "Swedish maritime law 1989-1995" in Lloyd's Maritime And Commercial Law 
Quarterly 1996, P. 519 (herein "Tiberg") 
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In 1990 the CMI held a meeting in Paris, especially to address the conflict of law 
problems 177. It even considered the drafting of a "Composite Text" which would 
incorporate desirable provisions of the Hamburg Rules into the existing Hague-Visby-
SDR Protocol text. Nevertheless, the composite text was not to be, and the Paris 
Plenary failed to resolve the emerging conflict of laws problems178. The only result was 
the ''Paris Declaration on Uniformity of the Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea". It 
contains the proposal to accept a couple of Hamburg's provisions as to the liability 
period, deck cargo, and the liability of the actual carrier. The only point where a 
majority voted for the retention of the current liability regime was the provision 
relating to the defence because nautical fault179. 
The CMI set up a International Sub-Committee on the Regime of Carriage of Goods 
by Sea 180. It is the opinion of the CMI that the Hague-Visby Rules need modification 
and additions. This International Sub-Committee met for the fourth time in London on 
the 27th and 28th of February 1997; as chairman acts Professor Berlingieri, Hon. 
President of the CMI. The Sub-Committee involved the national Maritime Law 
Associations. It considers the main issues covered by the Hague-Visby Rules. The 
main goal is to obtain international uniformity of the law of the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea. At the end a study shall have been created which than will be submitted to the 
competent UN organisations, since it is common view that the goal of uniformity 
cannot being safeguarded by UNCTAD and/or UNCITRAL181. 
UNCITRAL in its twenty-eighth session has expressed its concern about the problems 
that arose as a result of different liability regimes 182. The secretary-general of the 
United Nations had recommended in 1995 to the Governments of the Member States 
of the United Nations to consider an early adherence to the Hamburg Rules. 
UNCITRAL recognises the effort by the CMI to produce uniformity oflaw and the 
interest in working together. The aim by CMI to accept a new convention is upheld by 
the introduction of a "Jettison of Conventions Clause"183 . It contains the commitment 
by all Member States of the UN then adopting of a new convention, to jettison 
immediately any other Convention or national law concerning the carriage of goods by 
sea. 
Another question is whether uncontroversial parts of Hamburg can be accepted by 
voluntary agreements in the form of model clauses184. The CMI seems to be the 
appropriated organisation to introduce a draft in this direction. It wouldn't be a 
surprise if the CMI increase their endeavours to present a result in celebration of its 
100th anniversary in 1997. 
177 Sweeney, supra 7, P. 538 
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It is difficult to estimate the future of the Hamburg Rules. A certain degree of 
scepticism is probably reasonable. But it is interesting to remember that the policy of 
Uncitral, the organisation without its approval nowadays no international liability 
regime will have any success, itself remains committed to work towards the adoption 
ofHamburg185. 
7. Necessity of a uniform convention 
Despite current efforts towards a uniform convention, the discussion at the Sub-
Committee186 of the CMI again indicates how different and apparently irreconcilable 
the opinions are to some issues. Also the recent developments in some countries as the 
United States, China and the Scandinavian Countries must also introduce the question 
whether a uniform convention is necessary at all. 
Firstly, it must be mentioned that the twentieth century is characterised by a re-
emergence of the international lex mercatoria, consisting of international rules 
governing international transactions 187, which have come after a period of predominate 
national legal codification's in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It centres 
principally around an autonomous international commercial law188. The international 
lex mercatoria doesn't mean the development of one single global code of international 
trade acceptable to all countries of the world. This is rejected as being a straitjacket 
which slow down the growth of commercial practices and usage's189. It rather means a 
pattern oflaw which is multiform and complex. It will consist - among others - of 
international conventions190. International conventions are sources of the international 
lex mercatoria besides customs, general principles of law, and judicial decision and 
judicial commentaries191 . 
International conventions are sometimes described as legislation on the international 
level 192. As an important characteristic they are binding on states and not individuals. 
To be applicable to individuals they often need incorporation by legislation. During this 
process they often loose their uniformity193, which is perceived as a disadvantage of 
international conventions. The Hague Rules can serve as a good example for a 
convention which isn't applied uniformly194, especially because the Rules itself gives 
the possibility to individual adoption on a national level. The Hamburg Rules try to be 
effective against this misdevelopment by introducing the duty to adopt the rules as a 
185 so Dr Gerold Herrmann, Secretary ofUNCITRAL at a seminar "UNCITRAL Instnunents in South 
Africa" on March 11,1997 at the University of Stellenbosch 
186 Report of the Third Session of the 'International Sub-Committee on Uniformity of the Law 
Carriage of goods by Sea' of the CMI from 2'11' and 28th September 1996 by Frank L. Wiswall 
187 Booysen, supra 2, P. xiv 
188 Booysen, supra 2, P. 47 
189 Clive M. Schmitthoff"The Unification of the Law oflntemational Trade" in Journal of Business 
Law 1968, P. 105(112) (herein "Schmittho:ff') 
190 Schmitthoff, supra 189, P. 111 
191 Booysen, supra 2, P. 47 ff 
192 Clive Schmitthof"Intemational Business Law: A New Law Merchant" P. 33 ff 
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whole and by the inclusion of Article 3 of the Rules. (Latter provision reminds of an 
interpretation and application with regard to promote uniformity) This and the 
international exchange of national decisions- all which is a success of the Vienna 
Convention of 1980- could mitigate the disadvantage of international convention. The 
problem of creating uniform regimes to carriage of goods seems to be even less a 
general one. 
The movement towards international conventions indicates that there is a necessity for 
them, when one regards some conventions, for instance the Vienna Convention, one 
can see how well they work. This is particular necessary for international transport, 
since by its nature the transport crosses international borders and involves different 
national legal systems. The absence of an international legal regime to govern the 
transport, would mean that each national leg would be governed by a different legal 
system. Every time an international border is crossed, a new contract would have to be 
concluded and new documents would have to be issued. Also the specific hazard to 
ships, moving from port to port and being subject to arrest, cries out for international 
unification of maritime law195 . In international transport it is inherent that it links two 
countries together insofar as one part of the performance subject to the contract is 
executed in one country and an other part in an another country. 
International facts get a proper treatment with a sufficient degree of legal certainty 
only in an uniform law196 . It is a common opinion that ocean carriers need uniform 
international rules 197. Even the International Group of P&I Clubs represent the opinion 
that no nation should act independently but rather should move towards a uniform 
law198. The package or kilo limitations199, where at the moment at least nine different 
regimes exist, and the application of the "unit of account"200 should be sufficient to 
prove the difficulties carriers and shippers experience when they have to manage their 
businesses. This uncertainty limits the possibilities to calculate the risk a transport 
carnes. 
The international feature of transport and the requirement of forseeability for the 
parties of international transport are the main reasons for an uniformity of law. As 
understandable the development is towards national solos because of the slow 
ratification of Hamburg Rules, as detrimental it is for the international trade. 
The statement that a lack of effort to promote wider adherence to the Hamburg Rules 
indicates that the proliferation of differing legal regimes does not create serious enough 
legal problems201 , and misunderstand the real reason. It is the strong opposition by 
certain groups and the fear of something new which caused the deadlock. 
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8. Problems because of different liability regimes 
The discussion above should not distract from the fact, that presently and for some 
time in the future there will be different applicable liability regimes, at least three 
regimes, Hague Rules, Hague-Visby Rules, and Hamburg Rules, and besides that all 
having their own national orientation. Even the fact that very often the Hague-Visby 
Rules are incorporated by a Paramount Clause, which may spread its application 
beyond the contracting states of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, doesn't make it 
superfluous to deal with the problem of the existence of different regimes as the parties 
are nevertheless free to decide against the incorporation of a Paramount Clause in 
favour of Hague-Visby Rules while the Hamburg Rules itself seems to declare them 
null and void and vest the shipper with a damage claim according to Article 23. 1. 
There is no doubt that a number of different regimes raises several problems of 
overlapping regimes. One has only to imagine the case that in one and the same 
transport by a vessel, different regimes might be applicable to different goods. 
The liability of a carrier is determined by the law applicable to a certain forum. That is 
the reason why the carrier by contractual agreement frequently tries to choose a 
convenient forum. This is called the ''forum shopping". After the Hamburg Rules came 
into effect carriers are trying to avoid their application because of the increase of its 
liability through the introduction of the presumed fault principle202. 
Additionally, by application of Hamburg, a new risk for carriers arises, in Art 23 ID, 
namely that the omission of referring to the Hamburg Rules in the contract could cause 
a claim for compensation. 
In the following chapter several questions surrounding this problem will be discussed. 
How can the practise dealing with the draft of contractional provisions affect the 
situation? Is there a possibility of avoiding litigation in courts of member states of 
Hamburg? What impact does the coming into effect of Hamburg have on the 
formulation of Paramount Clauses? What possibilities exist to avoid judgements based 
on Hamburg but violating forum agreements? 
To answer these questions it is necessary to begin with an precise examination of the 
application system of Hamburg and to see what kind of cases exist where the regimes 
can overlap. 
8. 1. Application of the Hamburg Rules 
8.1.1. International scope of the Hamburg Rules (Art 2 I) 
The Hamburg Rules are only applicable to the international carriage of goods. This 
means that carriage between two states plus the fulfilment of one of the conditions in 
202 see above under heading 4.(2) 
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Art. 2 I lit. a-e is required for the Hamburg Rules to apply. The substantive scope also 
encompasses besides bill of lading sea way bills and data freight receipts203 as a 
consequence of the increasing paperless transactions in modem carriage of the goods. 
The Hamburg Rules follows, in terms of its application provisions other international 
transport conventions. Art 1 II of the Warsaw Convention (air), Art 1 I of the CMR 
Convention (road), Art 1 § 1 of the CIM Convention (rail), and Art 2 I Athena 
Convention (passenger) refer in particular to the agreed contract, that the departure 
and/or arriving points lie in the member states. The further conditions in Art. 2 I a-e of 
the Hamburg Rules stand side by side. Even when just one of these conditions is met 
the application of the Hamburg Rules is compulsory. A contracting-out isn't possible. 
Contractual agreements that derogate from the obligations under the Hamburg 
provisions are null and void according to Art. 23 I 1. The parties cannot avoid the 
application of the Hamburg Rules by choosing the law of a non-member state or the 
application of the Hague Rules or the Hague-Visby Rules. A corresponding Paramount 
Clause would be null and void204. These rigid and strict rules not known under the 
Hague-Visby Rules are designed to enforce a rapid spreading of the Rules205 . 
As said above the international carriage of goods need not occur between two 
Contracting States. It is sufficient that one of the States involved is a Contracting 
State. The following situations are covered: 
(a) Either the port of loading or the port of discharge mentioned in the contract is 
situated in a contracting State; or, 
(b) An optional port of discharge mentioned in the contract of carriage which becomes 
the actual port of discharge is situated in a Contracting State; or, 
( c) The bill of lading or other documents evidencing the contract is issued in a 
Contracting State; or, 
( d) The bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage provides 
for application of the Hamburg Rules or any national legislation giving effect to the 
provision of the Hamburg Rules. 
According to the Rules at Art 23 III in connection with Art 15 lit. 1, contract to which 
the Rules apply must include a clause stating that the Hamburg Rules are applicable. If 
this clause is missing, compensation is payable to a claimant who incurs loss as a result 
of omission of the clause. The loss may be caused by the claimant's having been 
mislead by the incorrect insertion in the bill of lading or by the failure of a court in a 
non-Contracting State to apply the Hamburg Rules when it would have done so if the 
statement had been inserted. The scope of the claim isn't easy to determine. The 
minimum should be the difference between the higher indemnity according the 
Hamburg Rules and a lower one held in a non-contracting state. 
203 see above under heading 4.(4) 
204 Peter Mankowski "Jurisdiction Clauses und Paramount Clauses nach dem Inkrafttreten der 
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The application system of the Hamburg Rules also contains provisions on jurisdiction 
according to Art 21. It sets out a list of places where juridical proceedings, at the 
option of the plaintiff, may be instituted: 
(a) the principal place of business or residence of the defendant; or 
(b) the place where the contract was made, provided the defendant has a representative 
in that location; or 
( c) the port of loading or discharge; or 
( d) any additional place designated for that purpose in the contract. 
In addition to the jurisdictions mentioned above an action may be brought in the court 
of a contracting State where the carrying vessel or another vessel owned by the carrier 
is arrested. 
In terms of arbitration Art 22 of the Hamburg Rules provides that the parties may 
agree to submit their disputes under the Hamburg Rules to arbitration. An agreement 
must be in writing. The places of arbitration corresponds with the places where 
juridical proceedings may be instituted. In this circumstances it is important to mention 
that Hamburg requires the arbitrator or arbitration tribunal to apply the Hamburg 
Rules. 
8.1.2. Cases where the application of different regimes overlaps 
The existence of different regimes entails cases where the application of a regime 
depends on the forum where the case will be brought. The following examples may 
demonstrate this. 
1) Transport from England ( where the Hague-Visby are applicable) to Chile 
(Hamburg Rules). The contract contains a London jurisdiction clause. The goods 
arrive damaged because of the fault of a drunk master. 
a) A court in England would have jurisdiction because of the jurisdiction clause. It 
would apply the Hague-Visby Rules with the consequence that the carrier could rely 
on the defence of nautical fault according to Art. IV NR. 2(a). 
b) However, when the carrier sues in Chile, the court would have jurisdiction 
according to Art 21 of the Hamburg Rules. The application bases on Art. 2, since 
there is transport to a contracting state. The jurisdiction clause is null and void 
according Art. 23 I 1 of the Hamburg Rules. The carrier would be held liable for the 
behaviour of its master according to Art. 5 of the Hamburg Rules. 
2) Transport from Chile to England. The contract contains a London jurisdiction-
clause. Any liability for damage caused by loading and discharge is excluded by 
contract. 
a) A court in England wouldn't apply the Hague-Visby Rules since no starting point 
exists. A decision would be based on common law with the result that the exclusion 
clause would be upheld. 
b) A court in Chile would apply the Hamburg Rules with the consequence that the 
carrier would has to pay. 
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In both cases the liability of the carrier would depend on the forum. 
3) An interesting case which illustrates that a carrier may be faced with application of 
the Hamburg Rules unexceptionally is the following one: 
A shipper in Hamburg agrees with a carrier to carry goods to Valparaiso, Chile, which 
has ratified the Hamburg Rules. The carriage goes via New York. The contractual 
carrier includes in the transport a further carrier for the leg between Hamburg and New 
York. This carrier might have no information about the final destiny of the goods and 
also that the Hamburg Rules might apply in a liability case brought in Chile. Since 
according to the Hamburg Rules not only the contractual carrier but even the actual 
carrier is liable for loss or damage, the possibility exists that the carrier executing the 
carriage from Hamburg to New York is liable under the Hamburg Rules206 when the 
forum is in Chile. 
These collision-cases demanding the application of conflict of law rules are suppose to 
exercise pressure on the states to ratify the Hamburg Rules207 . 
8.2. Elimination of the Hamburg Rules by suitable Jurisdiction clauses 
To avoid the higher liability risk the carrier is going to ask now, whether he can avoid 
being sued in a court in a contract-state of the Hamburg Rules by urging the shipper to 
an agree on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a non-contracting state of Hamburg. The 
answer must be found in the view of a court in a contracting-state of Hamburg. 
8.2.1. No derogation by Jurisdiction clause in a contract of carriage by sea 
Jurisdiction clauses agreed in advance of the damage case in a bill of lading or any 
other document would be null and void when it contains an exclusive character. Art. 
21 I lit. d of the Hamburg Rules "additional place" unequivocal determines that such 
jurisdiction clauses cannot derogate thejurisdictions of Art. 21 I lit. a-c Hamburg 
Rules. Such jurisdictions agreements can only open additional jurisdictions. They have 
no exclusive character. The clause has the effect of prorogation but not of derogation. 
8.2.2. Derogation by jurisdiction agreement after claim has arisen 
Agreements closed after the claim has arisen are effective according to Art. 21 V of 
the Hamburg Rules. This means that the parties after the event are free to derogate in 
terms of jurisdiction places with the consequence that just at this place a suit can be 
brought208 . 
206 examples given by Herber 95, supra 124, P. 263 
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The parties are even free to agree to submit their disputes to arbitration after the claim 
has arisen. In contrast to agreements in terms of arbitration in advance of the event, the 
arbitrator of an agreement after the damage or loss is not obliged to employ the 
Hamburg Rules when finding a decision according to Art. 22 VI of the Rules. 
The underlying idea of these rules is that the claimant, mostly the shipper, shouldn't be 
bound to other rules other than Hamburg. After the event which give rise to a claim for 
indemnity he is free to choose one of the places mentioned in the rules or to agree with 
the potential debtor to a different place with a different law. Reasons for such a 
decision by the claimant could be the convenience and security of trial conduct in a 
country with a reliable and sophisticated legal system or the chances of execution from 
a title in a country where the debtor owns properties209. 
It is important to mention that the shipper cannot be compelled in a contract of 
carriage by sea to agree to such an jurisdiction or arbitration place apart from 
contracting countries after the claim has arisen. Such a possibility would evade the 
character of the provisions of the Hamburg Rules and therefore be void. 
8.3. Protection by an appropriate clause 
It is usual that carriers in avoiding certain inconveniences of the law incorporate 
standard clauses in bills of lading or carriage of goods by sea contracts. The usage of a 
Paramount clauses incorporating the Hague-Visby rules is wide spread. The coming 
into effect of Hamburg will even cause the legal adviser of the carriers to find a 
formulation of a Paramount Clauses to secure the rights of the carrier in a best possible 
way. 
By drafting such a clause one has to consider the obligation according to Art. 23 III of 
the Hamburg Rules to include in the contract the statement that the carriage is subject 
to Hamburg. With regard to this obligation it is however sufficient to limit the 
application of the Hamburg Rules to the cases in which they are compulsory. Hence, 
the following clause is recommended210 : 
"This Contract of Carriage shall have effect subject to the provisions of the UN 
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, signed at Hamburg on March 31, 
1978 (Hamburg Rules) whenever they are to be applied compulsorily by the 
court seized to this contract pursuant to Art. 2 par. 1 lit. a or d of the said 
Convention". 
In non-contracting countries such a clause had the function of a partly-choice oflaw-
clause, which is subject to the will of the parties and could be interpreted that in courts 
out of contracting states the Hamburg Rules are not to apply211 . 
Even the P&I Clubs, which at the moment deny any cover when carriers voluntarily 
agree to the Hamburg Rules212, cannot have any complains with this clause. 
209 Mankowski, supra 204, P. 310 
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211 Mankowski, supra 204, P. 310 
212 Herber 95, supra 124, P. 264 
46 
The clause mentioned above protects the carrier in a best possible way of being sued 
on the basis of Hamburg Rules. This is especially likely in courts situated in contracting 
states of Hamburg. It is still a question under which circumstances outside of a 
contracting states to Hamburg, the chance exists that the court would apply the 
Hamburg Rules. 
In cases where a bill of lading is issued in a Hague-Visby contracting state or where 
the shipment is from a Hague Visby contracting state it is likely the case that courts 
situated in Hague-Visby countries apply Hague-Visby law even where local law in the 
receiving state would apply the Hamburg Rules. This is a matter of statute and hardly 
controversial. 
This case differs from another case where the port of loading or discharge is in a 
Hamburg Rules state and local law would apply those Rules. It is said, that even in this 
case the courts will still follow a contractual incorporation of the Hague-Visby 
Rules213 . An explanation for this is, that it is the will of the party which is more 
important than the facts which refer to the application of the law in a different 
country214 . 
It is concluded that the only case where courts outside of contracting states will apply 
the Hamburg Rules is where those Rules are incorporated by contract. A conflict with 
the statutory application of the Hague-Visby Rules is very unlikely, since the Hamburg 
Rules are increasing the liability of the carrier in relation to the Hague-Visby Rules 
through the introduction of the principle of presumed fault215; an increase of the 
liability however is allowed according to Art. ill 8216 . Hence, litigation outside of 
Hamburg's contracting states seems to be sufficient to avoid Hamburg in favour of the 
application of the Hague Rules when they are incorporated in the contract217. 
8.4. Legal Protection for the Carrier due to the violation of forum 
agreements 
An interesting question arises in connection with forum agreements containing the 
application of the Hague-Visby Rules where the shipper ignores this agreement and 
213 Rupert Steer "The Hamburg Rules-a storm in a teacup", in Lloyd's list; he gives the point of view 
of English courts, whose meaning is of great importance since plenty of bill of ladings refer disputes 
to English courts 
214 Steer, supra 213, refers to different cases as In Re Missouri Steamship Company (1889) 42 Ch D 
321 and Jones v Oceanic Steam Navigation Co LTD (1924) 2 KB 730 
215 see above under heading 4.(2) 
216 the House of Lords, in The Morviken, sub nom. The Hollandia (1983) 1 AC 565; (1983) 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. l, held that according to the English law forum agreements and choice of law clauses are null 
and void when their application leads to a less strict liability regime; the American courts are suppose 
to apply the same principle even without applying the Hague-Visby Rules so that a paramount clause 
in favour of Visby are preferred in relation to the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act according to 
Insurance Company of North America v. M/V "Atlantic Corona" 704 F.Supp. 528,529/ = 1989 AMC 
875,877 f (S.D.N.Y. 1989); and Associated Metals &Minerals Corp. v MIV "Arletis Sky" 1991 AMC 
1499, 1506 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
217 Steer, supra 213 
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files a suit in a contracting state of the Hamburg Rules concerning a case where the 
Hamburg Rules are applicable because of the lex fori and according to Art. 2 lit a-e of 
the Rules. The court has to ignore the forum agreement favouring of the Hague-Visby 
Rules since the application of Hamburg in such a case is compelling and the agreement 
null and void according to Art. 23 I of the Rules. It would be of interest now for the 
carrier whether judgements in such cases would be accepted and executed in other 
countries and whether the carrier may protect himself against the violation of 
contractual agreements. 
The answer to these questions depends on the legal systems of every single state so 
that a general answer applicable to all legal systems cannot be given. Since most bills 
of lading have incorporated the Hague Rules with a forum agreement or arbitration 
clause referring to London it shall be examined how the English legal system would 
respond to this problem. The remarks are added with some mention at the German 
legal system. The examination is based on the case where transport takes place from 
London to Chile and the contract of carriage on sea contains a jurisdiction clause 
referring to London218 . 
8.4.1. The Recognition and Enforcement of decisions 
A judgement obtained in Chile in favour of the shipper would be sought to be enforced 
in England presuming the carrier has its properties mainly in England. The recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in England is regulated in the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgement Act 1982 (CJJA 1982). According to section 32 (l)(a) CJJA 1982 a 
judgement experiences no recognition when it occurred "contrary to an agreement 
under which the dispute in question was to be settled ... ". By way of exception the 
decision would be recognised when the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of 
that court. According to section 33 CJJA no submission would be made where the 
contest of the jurisdiction or the "ask to dismiss or stay the proceedings on the ground 
that the dispute in question should have been submitted to arbitration or the 
determination of the courts of another country" occures. Hence, the carrier need not to 
fear the enforcement of the judgement in England. Nevertheless, the possibility exists 
that the vessel or a sister vessel may be arrested in Chile or elsewhere. Vessels are used 
for transport around the world and are especially exposed to arrests. 
In Germany recognition of such an judgement would be very likely since only 
judgements violating the ordre public are rejected; the requirements to fulfil such an 
violation are strict and hardly conceivable in a case where the judgement offends 
against a own provision, here the priority of a jurisdiction agreement219. 
218 concerning the case see above under heading 8.1.2. case 1) 
219 Herber 95, supra 124, P. 265 
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8.4.2. Compensatory Damage 
It is a common view that according to English law the carrier is entitled to claim 
damages when the shipper has violated the jurisdiction - or arbitration agreement220 . 
The problem is that the claimant, here the carrier, has to prove substantial loss which 
just exists when the original judgement is already executed. 
The contractual clause may even exclude the introduction of provisional legal 
protections with the consequence that their introduction justifies a damage claim. It is 
however rather doubtful whether a jurisdiction clause already includes remedies in 
terms of provisional legal protections221 . Reasons for the use of provisional legal 
protection suddenly arise which calls for immediately response where the problem 
arises; this must not be at the location of the agreed jurisdiction but may even 
elsewhere. 
In this connection it is worthwhile to merition the possibility in the English law to 
secure a later judgement by issuing a mareva injunction which freezes the assets of the 
defendant222. This could be of interest for the carrier claiming damages to secure his 
claim before the issuing of the judgement. 
Even under the German law it would be possible to claim damages due to the violation 
of a contractual agreement223 . 
However, it must be said that even the damages claim cannot eliminate uncertainties 
insofar as the shipper will still be able to enforce a judgement based on the Hamburg 
Rules. 
8.4.3. Declaration of non-liability 
The remedy of a declaration of non-liability, which is generally available, has the same 
weakness as the compensatory damage suit as it does not prevents the enforcement of 
an judgement based on the Hamburg Rules. 
220 Mustill and Boyd "The law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England" (2nd. ed., London 
1989) 409,461, 524; Mantovani v. Caraplli Spa (1980) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 375 
221 Regina Asoriotis "Urteile nach den Hamburg-Regeln unter Verletzung vertraglicher 
Gerichtsstands- und Schiedsgerichtsklauseln" in Transportrecht 1995, 266 (270) (herein "Asoriotis") 
Fn 24 with referring to Mike Trading and Transport Ltd. V. R. Pagnan andfratelli(Lisboa) (1980) 2 
lloyd 's Rep. 546 
222 Ough and Flenley, The Mareva Injunction and Anton Pillar Order (2nd ed., London 1993) 
223 Herber 95, supra 124, P.265 · 
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8.4.4. Restraining order/ antisuit injunction 
By issuing a restraining order or an antisuit injunction the defendant is prohibited from 
filing or proceeding with a suit in a foreign country224. The remedies are derived from 
judge-made law and section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The decision by the 
court is based on equity; the claimant is not legally entitled to the issue of an 
restraining order since the decision is in the discretion of the court. The success 
depends on the existence of vexatious or oppressive225 . Contempt of the court can 
result in prison, fine or sequestration according to section 14(1) of the Contempt of 
Court Act (1981). 
These remedies are extremely effective since they interfere with litigation abroad226 . 
That's the reason why strict conditions are required for the approval of vexatious and 
oppressive227 . The courts recognise the existence of vexatious and oppressive when a 
violation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause exist228 . A further crucial point promoting 
the existence of vexations and oppressions means the ineffectiveness of a claim of 
damage as a remedy against a breach of contract229. 
8.5. Summary 
The measures and remedies practice employs either to evade the application of a 
certain regime, here the Hamburg Rules, or to mitigate their impact, cannot derogate 
from the fact that the existence of several regimes is an unsatisfied state to be in. 
9. Way to the creation of uniform law - Conclusion 
The international rules concerning shipping law do not consist of a complete system of 
material provisions, as mentioned above, but rather constitute a "multicoloured 
manufactured patch-carpet" with many imperfections. Though standardisation is 
advanced in some areas of shipping, many of these conventions partly overlap. This 
latter statement is especially applicable to the area of liability regimes where three 
different international regimes may apply in addition to a host of different national 
ones. The Hamburg Rules are only a patch on the carpet. But one thing is 
uncontroversial, the fact that the shipping law is still far away from complete 
standardisation. 
224 Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (12th ed. London 1993),408-411 
225 Castanbo v. Brown & Root (UK.) Ltd. (1980) 2 Lloyd's rep. 423 
226 it is doubtful whether the German legal system would apply such a remedy 
227 Castanbo v. Brown & Root (UK.) Ltd. (1980) 2 Lloyd's rep. 423 
228 Sohio Supply Co. v. Gatoil (USA) Inc. (1989) Lloyd's Rep. 588; Continental Bank NA. v. Aeakos 
Compania Naviera S.A. 
229 Continental Bank NA. v. Aeakos Compania Naviera S.A. 512 
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Once it is accepted that standardisation is a goal which should be achieved ( there 
seems to be few objections to this point) one has to contemplate on how this is to be 
done. 
Legal standardisation is not an act of scientific knowledge but an act of legislation230 . 
The problem is, that international legislation does not exist231 , so that one has to go the 
stony route via national legislation. 
Uniformity is impeded by different legal systems in countries, different economic 
systems as well as differences in cultural backgrounds. Even misunderstandings 
concerning the language and terms of international conventions exists not least because 
of formal compromises and uncertainties of the translations of the Rules into different 
languages which hampers the process of clear standards. A further factor causing 
problems are the court decisions on a national level. 
Standardisation can only be achieved in a two step process. Firstly the adoption of 
conventions at international conferences and secondly their ratification by the national 
parliaments. 
A successful conference is decided by its attractiveness and thorough preparation. The 
attractiveness of a convention is determined by its object, its circle of participants, and 
its content. In the run-up to the conference all the major groups must work together, 
the scientists, the administrators, the legislators and the economists. Different maxims 
must be taken into account232, as 
■ creating conventions only for objects which are of practical legislative interests only 
■ allowing preparation and participation by only those states with an material interest 
in the topic 
■ solutions acceptable by a large number of states 
■ the relationship to former and future conventions 
■ a preparation assisted by a secretary and the consulting of the science 
The ratification of the convention through the national parliaments is still necessary. 
Economic and political neutrality cannot be assumed nor the fact that the national 
legislator will submit to a decision by a majority of member states at a conference. The 
transfer of sovereign rights would provide a uniform political will233, which does not 
exists. 
The fact that at the moment only a small number of states have ratified the Hamburg 
Rules does not indicate its weakness or failure. Both the advance preparation and 
result at the Hamburg conference, that is the Hamburg Rules, indicate that several of 
the important conditions mentioned above were met. The preparation period covered a 
long time, seven years in fact. The scientists and the economists were involved as well 
as the representatives from large number of countries. The relation to former 
230 Herber FS, supra 23, P. 67 
231 the EU builds insofar an exception, but just for the members of the EU 
232 Herber FS, supra 23, P. 70 
233 Herber FS, supra 23, P. 69 
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conventions was taken into account and the preparation had been assisted by a 
secretary. Nevertheless, reservations remained. 
Besides the existence of rational reasons for resisting Hamburg, especially the nautical 
fault and the jurisdiction provisions, there are also some irrational and psychological 
reasons responsible for this resistance. It is always difficult to find support for 
something new, especially if it affects the economy. Besides that, it seems to be a 
problem of paternity insofar as the economy blocks a regime which it hasn't created234. 
Hamburg's contribution to standardisation cannot be overlooked. The Hamburg Rules 
constitute an important approximation to the other transport conventions and its 
adoption prepared the way to the UN Convention on Multimodal Transport. Finally, 
this development will lead to an international lex mercatoria which facilitates 
international trade. 
There is hardly any doubt that after Hague and Hague-Visby a new convention was 
necessary. Most of Hamburg's provisions are widely accepted. Taking this into 
account one has to wonder why Hamburg hasn't been ratified by more states so far. 
Better alternatives are not in sight. A further protocol to Hague-Visby or a new 
convention does not seem advisable. This latter way requires a lot of effort and would 
be a waste of all the work put into Hamburg. A further protocol, however, would be 
half-hearted. While the Hamburg Rules in content could be successful and while its 
final success depends on ratification, one could seek the way via an international 
conference at which states share a common commitment to ratify the Rules 
simultaneously. 
Whether Hamburg fails or succeeds depends on adequate ratification and there is at 
least a good chance that further ratifications will follow so that success is possible. 
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